Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks by Gauer, Florian & Hellmann, Tim
Center for
Mathematical Economics
Working Papers 529
August 2017
Strategic Formation of Homogeneous
Bargaining Networks
Florian Gauer and Tim Hellmann
Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW)
Bielefeld University
Universita¨tsstraße 25
D-33615 Bielefeld · Germany
e-mail: imw@uni-bielefeld.de
http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/wp/
ISSN: 0931-6558
Strategic Formation of Homogeneous Bargaining Networks✩
F. Gauera,∗, T. Hellmanna
aCenter for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld University, P.O. Box 100131, D-33501 Bielefeld
Abstract
We study a model of strategic network formation prior to a Manea (2011a) bargaining game:
ex-ante homogeneous players form costly undirected links, anticipating expected equilibrium
payoffs from the subsequent bargaining game. Assuming patient players, we provide a com-
plete characterization of generically pairwise stable networks: specific unions of separated
pairs, odd circles, and isolated players constitute this class. We also show that many other
structures, such as larger trees or unbalanced bipartite networks, cannot be pairwise stable
at all. The analysis implies that the diversity of possible bargaining outcomes is small in
(generically) pairwise stable networks.
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JEL-Classification: C72, C78, D85
1. Introduction
Markets often do not satisfy the assumptions imposed by general equilibrium theory. For
instance, not all buyers may be able to trade freely with all sellers. Instead, the opportunity
to create a joint surplus between two participants in a market may be influenced by several
frictions such as the availability of information about trade opportunities, transportation
costs, heterogeneous preferences, etc. Recent literature has paid particular attention to
markets where opportunities to create a joint surplus are restricted to a network (see e.g.,
Manea, 2016, for a comprehensive overview of this literature). For such markets, it is shown
that the law of one price cannot be upheld. Rational choice of market participants, instead,
gives rise to bargaining over the division of the surplus created by the bilateral interactions,
implying that prices can be heterogeneous and depend on the location of the trade in the
network.
The literature has focused almost exclusively on settings where the network, representing
bargaining opportunities, is exogenously given.1 However, if agents receive payoffs from
bargaining such that for the outcome of the bargaining game agents’ network positions matter
(see e.g. Manea, 2011a, where equilibrium payoffs only depend on the network position and
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the discount factor), then agents will have incentives to influence the network structure. In
such situations, the underlying network should not be regarded as being exogenously given
but as the outcome of strategic interaction among agents. We fill this gap in the literature by
allowing agents to create the network prior to market interaction. This will be particularly
relevant in markets where potential gains from trade are large relative to other exogenous
reasons for network creation. However, such a market will not be without frictions, as
interactions can be costly which may be motivated by time and effort required to initiate a
relationship.
In such a setting, agents face a trade-off when forming links in the network: while new
connections give rise to additional outside options via new trade opportunities, agents also
incur the cost of network formation. Which networks can we expect to form depending on
the costs of links relative to joint surplus? The answer to this question has fundamental
implications for the induced bargaining outcome. Can we expect to observe heterogeneous
bargaining outcomes implied by heterogeneous network positions? Or will ex-ante homoge-
neous players rather form networks that ensure equitable payoffs?
To answer these questions, we set up a sequential model of strategic network formation
prior to a Manea (2011a) infinite-horizon network bargaining game. Ex ante homogeneous
players first form undirected, costly links. In the second stage, the resulting network is
taken as given and players sequentially bargain with neighbors for the division of a mutually
generated unit surplus. According to Manea (2011a), all subgame perfect equilibria of the
bargaining game are payoff equivalent. To abstract from issues of time preferences, we
additionally assume that players are infinitely patient in the bargaining stage. The resulting
limit equilibrium payoff in the bargaining stage can be obtained employing an algorithm
that has been developed in Manea (2011a) and which only depends on the network position
of each player. Anticipating equilibrium outcomes in the second stage, players then interact
strategically in the network formation stage.
We use the seminal approach of Manea (2011a) to model market interaction for several
reasons. First, Manea does not restrict the set of networks to bipartite networks (i.e. buyer
seller networks) and does not characterize equilibrium outcomes for only a restricted set of
networks. In particular, none of the distorting effects are present that might otherwise arise
from additional incentives to add or delete links, e.g. from ex-ante heterogeneity among play-
ers, or in buyer-seller scenarios. Second, Manea’s network bargaining game is analytically
tractable and has some well behaved equilibrium properties. Subgame perfect equilibria are
payoff equivalent for any level of time discount, implying for our setting a unique equilibrium
payoff in the second stage for any network formed in the first stage. When players become
patient, Manea characterizes limit equilibrium payoffs by developing an equally convenient
and sophisticated algorithm. We make extensive use of this algorithm and contribute to a
deeper understanding of its features throughout this paper. Finally, because of the station-
arity assumption that we share in our approach, stochastic effects do not play a role for
equilibrium payoff. Instead, the limit equilibrium payoff of the bargaining stage solely de-
2
pends on the network position, allowing to model network formation prior to the bargaining
stage in a well defined sense.
To characterize resulting network structures, we use the notion of pairwise stability intro-
duced in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). We further distinguish between network structures
that are pairwise stable for a range of cost levels, denoted as generically pairwise stable, and
networks that are only stable for a single cost level, called nongenerically pairwise stable. We
present necessary and sufficient conditions for networks to be pairwise stable (Theorems 1, 2
and 3) and are able to deduce a complete characterization of the set of generically pairwise
stable networks as our first main result (Corollary 3). The empty network is uniquely pair-
wise stable for high costs of network formation. For intermediate cost ranges a network is
generically pairwise stable if and only if it consists of connected pairs of players, sometimes
also called a matching, (and an isolated player, if the number of players is odd). For smaller
costs of network formation, also larger components than just pairs may occur such that a
network is generically pairwise stable if and only if any nonsingleton component is either an
odd circle (where the number of admissible players in the component is inversely related to
the cost of network formation), or a connected pair, and there exists at most one isolated
player. This result also establishes the existence of pairwise stable networks at each level
of linking costs. We observe only relatively sparse network structures since disagreement
links cannot be contained in a pairwise stable network (Proposition 1). A disagreement link
denotes a link which is never used to generate surplus in the bargaining stage and therefore
does not yield any value while causing costs.
Nongenerically pairwise stable networks only occur once at a given cost level since players
are exactly indifferent between forming a link or not. Therefore, richer structures may be
nongenerically pairwise stable. However, we are able to substantially narrow down this set
of networks by revealing that no component of such a network can be too unbalanced or too
intraconnected, can be a tree (with more than three players), or can contain a particular
“cut-player” whose removal results in a larger number of components (Proposition 2).
Beyond the insights into the structure of pairwise stable networks, we study the implica-
tions for the bargaining outcomes. As our second main result, we conclude from our complete
characterization that pairwise stability substantially narrows down the diversity of induced
bargaining outcomes among players (Corollary 4). More specifically, all players with at least
one link in generically pairwise stable networks receive the same limit equilibrium payoff
in the bargaining stage. In that sense, networks – when restricted to the set of connected
players – are equitable. However, in generically pairwise stable networks, players may very
well incur different network formation costs to obtain the same limit equilibrium payoff in
the bargaining stage. One possible left-over isolated player may also exist, receiving a limit
equilibrium payoff of 0 in the bargaining stage. Nongenerically pairwise stable networks,
however, admit heterogeneous limit equilibrium payoffs in the bargaining stage, although
players are ex ante homogeneous.
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1.1. Related Literature
Besides Manea (2011a), a substantial literature developed recently that studies models
of market interaction on networks. Particular attention has been paid to the bargaining
process determining prices.
The study of bargaining problems has a long tradition in the economic literature and
dates back to the work of Nash (1950, 1953). Modeling bargaining more explicitly, Rubin-
stein (1982) introduces the well known extensive game between two players with alternating
offers. Extending this approach to a setting of two populations (e.g. buyers and sellers) with
constant sizes, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) show that outcomes of the bargaining pro-
cess depend on outside options such as matching probabilities. The assumption that markets
are stationary in the sense that population sizes stay constant over time is critical for their
result as Gale (1987) shows. The work of Manea (2011a), to which we add a preceding stage
of strategic interaction, can, hence, be regarded as an extension of these seminal papers. As-
suming stationarity, bargaining power is endogenized in a natural and well-defined manner
as an outcome of the given network structure and the respective player’s position in it.
There are other approaches to model bargaining on networks and the outcomes depend on
the assumed bargaining protocol. In the early work of Corominas-Bosch (2004) on bargaining
on networks, buyers and sellers make public offers although trade is restricted to the network.
It is shown that trade is efficient in the sense that the maximal number of trades occur and
that payoffs depend on the network position. This result extends to a one-population model
with a centralized matching procedure that selects trading links from the network efficiently,
as Polanski (2007) shows. Allowing for decentralized matching, Abreu and Manea (2012a)
and Abreu and Manea (2012b) study a model similar to Manea (2011a), but without relying
on network stationarity. Instead, players who reach an agreement are not replaced. In such a
model, agreements are not necessarily reached immediately in equilibrium nor are agreements
efficient. Because of the additional complexity that arises due to stochastic effects once the
stationarity assumption is relaxed, it is not possible to derive a closed form solution of
expected payoffs and, hence, there is little hope to study network formation prior to such
a bargaining model. Instead, the assumption of network stationarity ensures a tractable
solution of the bargaining stage in Manea (2011a).
Studying network formation when incentives are determined by the bargaining outcome,
we also contribute to the literature on strategic network formation which has been inspired
by the seminal paper of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). Other prominent works which have
been carried out since then (although not in a bargaining framework) are those by Bala and
Goyal (2000), Calvó-Armengol (2004), Galeotti et al. (2006), Goyal and Joshi (2003, 2006),
and Watts (2001), to name a few. Some effort has also been dedicated to gaining rather
general insights regarding the existence, uniqueness, and structure of stable networks; see,
for example, Hellmann (2013) and Hellmann and Landwehr (2014).2
2Note, however, that the results of Hellmann (2013) and Hellmann and Landwehr (2014) are in general
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There is only little literature studying market interaction in endogenous networks. In
one early approach by Kranton and Minehart (2001), buyers can form costly links to sellers,
prior to a draw of private values and an ascending price auction. Pairwise stable networks
are shown to maximize expected welfare. However, this result is not robust to bilateral
link formation or split of costs between buyers and sellers, as Elliott (2015) shows. Market
interaction in terms of auctions also yields fundamentally different results than bargaining
as all the gains from trade are obtained by one side of the market. In endogenous buyer-
seller networks where outcomes are the result of bargaining instead of auctions, Polanski and
Vega-Redondo (2013) show inefficiency of stable networks. Both the payoff resulting from
bargaining and the restriction to a buyer-seller setup in these papers differ from our model.
There is also some literature studying network formation prior to a bargaining game
without restricting to the bipartite nature of buyer-seller networks. Calvó-Armengol (2003)
considers a similar framework as ours. In the first stage, players form the network, on which
they bargain in the second stage. The bargaining protocol, however, differs from Manea
(2011a) in several crucial aspects since bargaining ends after one agreement has been formed
and a selection function is chosen randomly to determine the sequence of offers. With a given
selection function, the equilibria in the bargaining stage are extremely simple depending only
on the first mover advantage. As a consequence, a player’s network position affects bargaining
power only in terms of the probability of being selected as a proposer or responder. This leads
to a characterization of pairwise stable networks in which the players’ neighborhood size is
the only relevant feature of the network structure. In our approach, instead, the network
influences payoffs in a more complex way resulting from the Manea (2011a) bargaining game.
The results in Calvó-Armengol (2003) therefore differ substantially from our results though
we both share the assumption of costly links.
Trade between possibly distant but connected players in an endogenous network is mod-
eled in Condorelli and Galeotti (2012). Since the length of the trading path does not affect
the surplus, only minimal networks form and results can be compared to the two way flow
model in Bala and Goyal (2000). In our model, instead, the opportunity to create joint
surplus only arises between directly connected players.
Most closely related to our approach, may be an extension in the online appendix of
Manea (2011a), referred to as Manea (2011b). There, Manea also studies network formation
prior to his bargaining game in the second stage, but assumes no cost of link formation. A
network is then pairwise stable if and only if it is equitable meaning that all players receive
the same payoff. We complement this approach by asking whether we can expect the same
networks to form even if links are costly.3
not applicable to our framework, because our model does not include certain crucial conditions that would
permit such an application. For details, see Gauer (2016, Appendix 3.B).
3In fact, we show that only “skeletons” of equitable networks (that is, certain unions of separated pairs
and odd circles) survive if costs are positive. However, nonequitable networks, such as unions of odd circles
and an isolated player, can also be pairwise stable in our setting.
5
For a more comprehensive survey of the literature on market interaction on networks,
the reader may be referred to Manea (2016).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model,
including the decisive results of Manea (2011a). The main results on the structure of stable
networks and induced bargaining outcomes are developed in Section 3. Finally, Section 4
concludes. The more evolved proofs are presented in Appendix A.
2. The Model
Consider a finite set of ex ante identical players N = {1, 2, ..., n}, n ≥ 3, and discrete
time periods t = 0, 1, 2, ... of interaction. In the initial period t = 0, players form the network
and in periods t = 1, 2, ... engage in an infinite horizon bargaining game over the division of
a unit surplus generated by the links.
We denote a connection or link between two players i, j ∈ N , i 6= j by {i, j} which
we abbreviate for simplicity by ij = ji := {i, j}. We then define the complete network
gN = {ij | i, j ∈ N, i 6= j} as the network where any two players are connected to each other
and the set of all undirected networks by G = {g | g ⊆ gN}. Let Ni(g) := {j ∈ N | ij ∈ g}
denote the set of player i’s neighbors in g and let ηi(g) := |Ni(g)| be its cardinality which is
also referred to as the degree of player i. Furthermore, for a network g, a set C ⊆ N is said
to be a component if there exists a path between any two players in C and it is Nj(g)∩C = ∅
for all j /∈ C.4 The set of all components of g then defines a partition of the player set N . A
subnetwork g′ ⊆ g is said to be component-induced if there exists a component C of g such
that g′ = g|C where the network g|K := {ij ∈ g | i, j ∈ K} is the subnetwork restricted to the
player set K ⊂ N . In addition, for two networks g, g′ ⊆ gN let g−g′ := g\g′ (g+g′ := g∪g′,
respectively) denote the network obtained by deleting the set of links g′∩g from (adding the
set of links g′\g to) the network g.
The bargaining stage taken from Manea (2011a) can be described as follows. After the
network has been formed in period t = 0, nature randomly chooses one link ij ∈ g in
each period t = 1, 2, ... with equal probability.5 The chosen link generates the surplus that
both involved players can divide among themselves. One of the two players is randomly
assigned the role of the proposer while the other one is selected as responder, again with
equal probability. The proposer makes an offer how to distribute the unit surplus while the
responder can accept or reject the offer: If the offer is rejected, then both players receive a
4We say that there exists a path between two players i′, i′′ ∈ N in g if there exist players i1, i2, ..., im¯ ∈ N ,
m¯ ∈ N, such that i1 = i
′, im¯ = i
′′ and imim+1 ∈ g for m = 1, 2, ..., m¯− 1.
5Manea (2011a) allows for an arbitrary link selection probability distribution (with full support) in the
bargaining stage. However, to calculate payoffs in examples and to model network formation (see Manea,
2011b), Manea often relies on the “uniform matching technology” that selects links with equal probability. For
ease of notation, we also rely on this uniform matching technology. This is done w.l.o.g. since the probability
distribution over links does not affect payoffs in the limit δ → 1 as long as it has full support. Further, we
save notation for not having to define a new link selection probability distribution for every possible network,
giving rise to a simple calculation of equilibrium payoffs, see (1).
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payoff of zero and stay in the game whereas both leave with the agreed shares if the offer
is accepted. In the latter case, both players get replaced one-to-one in the next period such
that the initially formed network remains unchanged.6,7 The network structure, as well as all
offers and responses are common knowledge. A player’s strategy in this extensive form game
pins down the offer she makes as proposer and the answer she gives as responder after each
possible history of the game. Based on this, a player’s payoff is then given by her discounted
expected agreement share. A strategy profile is said to be a “subgame perfect equilibrium”
of the bargaining game if it induces Nash equilibria in subgames following every history.
Players are assumed to discount time by a uniform discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
A key result in Manea is that all subgame perfect equilibria are payoff equivalent and
that each player’s equilibrium payoff exclusively depends on her network position and the
discount factor δ (see Manea, 2011a, Theorem 1). Moreover, the equilibrium payoff vector,
which we denote as v∗δ(g) = (v∗δi (g))i∈N , is the unique solution to the equation system
vi =
(
1−
ηi(g)
2d#(g)
)
δvi +
∑
j∈Ni(g)
1
2d#(g)
max{1− δvj , δvi}, ∀i ∈ N, (1)
where d#(g) denotes the total number of links in the network g. To see why equilibrium
payoff has to satisfy (1), note that by the stationarity assumption there exists a subgame
perfect equilibrium where strategies are such that each player i always accepts any offer that
gives her at least her continuation value δvi and always makes the same proposal (depending
on the identity of responder). In the latter case, she has the first mover advantage and can
extract all the remaining surplus from the match. Thus, she offers to j his continuation value
δvj if her own resulting share, 1−δvj , is not below her continuation value δvi. The probability
with which i is selected to propose to j is given by 1
2d#(g)
. Hence, equilibrium payoffs have to
satisfy (1) and are in fact the unique solution to this system of equations. This implies that an
agreement between i and j is only feasible in equilibrium if δ
(
v∗δi (g)+ v
∗δ
j (g)
)
≤ 1 giving rise
to the definition of the equilibrium agreement network g∗δ :=
{
ij ∈ g | δ
(
v∗δi (g)+v
∗δ
j (g)
)
≤ 1
}
.
Throughout this paper, we abstract from issues of time preferences in order to have
equilibrium payoffs depend solely on the network structure. Thus, we focus on the limit case
of δ → 1, meaning that players are infinitely patient. For δ large enough, Manea (2011a,
Theorem 2) finds that the equilibrium agreement network g∗δ does not change in response
to a change in δ taking the network g as given, i.e. after the network g has been formed in
the first stage. This network g∗ ⊆ g is then called the limit equilibrium agreement network.
Moreover, Manea (2011a, Theorem 2) also implies that the limit equilibrium payoff vector
6The replacement assumption is primarily due to technical reasons. The implication that the network
structure does not change over time makes the model analytically tractable. See also the discussion on
models without replacement, e.g. Abreu and Manea (2012b), in Section 1.1.
7Because of replacement after successful agreements, Manea carefully distinguishes between network po-
sitions and (potentially) different players being in one and the same position in different periods. However,
as we examine solely the stage of network formation at time t = 0 here, we can neglect this distinction.
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v∗(g) := limδ→1 v
∗δ(g) is well-defined, i.e. it always exists.
Manea develops a smart algorithm to determine the limit equilibrium payoff vector v∗(g)
and we make heavily use of this computational method. To prepare for the implementation of
the algorithm we need to introduce some additional notation. For any set of players M ⊆ N
and any network g let Lg(M) := {j ∈ N | ij ∈ g, i ∈ M} be the corresponding partner set
in g, that is the set of players having a link to a player in M . Further, a set M ⊆ N is called
g-independent if we have g|M := {ij ∈ g | i, j ∈ M} = ∅, i.e. if no two players contained in
M are linked in g. Moreover, let I(g) ⊆ P(N) denote the set of all nonempty g-independent
subsets of N . The algorithm is then defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Manea (2011a)). For a given network g and player set N , the algorithm A(g)
provides a sequence (rs, xs,Ms, Ls, Ns, gs)s=1,...,s¯ which is defined recursively as follows. Let
N1 := N and g1 := g. For s ≥ 1, if Ns = ∅ then stop and set s¯ = s. Otherwise, let
rs = min
M⊆Ns,M∈I(g)
|Lgs(M)|
|M |
. (2)
If rs ≥ 1 then stop and set s¯ = s. Otherwise, set xs =
rs
1+rs
. Let Ms be the union of all
minimizers M in (2). Denote Ls := L
gs(Ms). Let Ns+1 := Ns\(Ms∪Ls) and gs+1 := g|Ns+1.
Given such a sequence (rs, xs,Ms, Ls, Ns, gs)s=1,...,s¯ being the outcome of the described
algorithm A(g), the limit equilibrium payoff vector for this network can be determined
by applying a simple rule. Note that this rather sophisticated result of Manea (2011a,
Theorem 4) is absolutely fundamental for our work.
Payoff Computation (Manea (2011a)). Let (rs, xs,Ms, Ls, Ns, gs)s=1,...,s¯ be the outcome of
A(g) for a given network g. Then the limit equilibrium payoffs are given by
v∗i (g) = xs for all i ∈Ms, s < s¯,
v∗j (g) = 1− xs for all j ∈ Ls, s < s¯,
v∗k(g) =
1
2 for all k ∈ Ns¯.
(3)
To see what the algorithm A(g) in combination with the payoff calculation rule actually
does, consider a network g and player set N . At each step s the algorithm identifies the so
called minimal shortage ratio rs among the remaining players Ns in the network gs = g|Ns ,
which is obtained by finding the largest gs-independent set Ms to minimize
rs =
|Ls|
|Ms|
,
where Ls is the partner set of Ms. Since Ms is gs-independent, the only potential sources to
obtain a share of the surplus for players in Ms are the players in the partner set Ls. If Ls is
small relative to Ms, the players in Ls are in a powerful bargaining position to extract large
shares of the surplus. The algorithm then determines at each step the minimal shortage
ratios to detect the players in strongest and weakest bargaining position, since they will not
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find agreements with other players. The limit equilibrium payoff of the players in Ms is then
given by xs =
rs
1+rs
= |Ls||Ms|+|Ls| <
1
2 while their partners in Ls receive 1− xs =
|Ms|
|Ms|+|Ls|
> 12
such that xs, the share of players inMs, is increasing in the shortage ratio. These players are
then deleted from the network and the algorithm moves forward to the next step. It stops
as soon as there are either no more players left or if the minimal shortage ratio is greater
than or equal to one. In the latter case, the limit equilibrium payoff of all remaining players
is 12 . We also illustrate how the algorithm works for the three player case in Section 3.1.
When players form the network in the first stage, they anticipate the outcome of the
bargaining game. For simplicity, we also refer to this outcome as player i’s payoff, i.e. the
limit equilibrium payoff from the bargaining stage. However, network formation is costly
such that each formed link causes costs c > 0 for both players involved. This may be
motivated as time and effort that needs to be spend in order to create a relationship. Given
network g ∈ G, this implies that players bear network formation costs of ηi(g)c for all i ∈ N .
Thus, it is important to precisely distinguish between a player’s payoff from the bargaining
stage and a player’s profit which we define as her payoff net of linking costs. Thus, in period
t = 0, each player i ∈ N intends to maximize her profit
u∗i (g) := v
∗
i (g)− ηi(g)c.
Although only one link can generate benefits, other links may represent outside options
and the bargaining outcome depends on the whole network. The forces described above
then lead to conflicting interests among strategic players. Therefore, players face a trade-off
when forming links: On the one hand, players benefit from own links via additional outside
options. On the other hand, however, links are costly, which results in an interesting problem
of network formation.
The described algorithmA(g) together with the previous considerations pins down payoffs
and, therefore, the profit u∗i (g) of each connected player i ∈ N . It is straightforward to see
that the profile of profits u∗ = (u∗i )i∈N is component-decomposable, meaning that u
∗
i (g) =
u∗i (g|Ci(g)) for all players i ∈ N and networks g. Here, Ci(g) ⊆ N denotes the component
of player i in g. Thus, player i’s profit is not affected by subnetworks which are induced by
components not containing i. In particular, this implies that we can straightforwardly extend
the algorithm A(g) to isolated players receiving a payoff of 0 since they have no bargaining
partner they could generate a unit surplus with.8
We do not model strategic interaction in the network formation stage (t = 0) explicitly,
but instead directly rely on equilibrium notions. Depending on the rules of network formation
which are assumed, there are many definitions of equilibrium at hand. Here, we consider only
the well-known concept of pairwise stability introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
8Manea develops the algorithm A(g) under the assumption that there are no isolated players in the
underlying network g. However, it is easy to see that it is still possible to apply the algorithm A(g) with M1
consisting of all isolated players yielding Lg(M) = ∅ and, hence, r1 = 0 implying x1 = 0.
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Definition 2 (Pairwise Stability, Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)). Consider the player set N
and a profile of network utility or profit functions (ui)i∈N . Then a network g is said to be
pairwise stable if
(i) for all ij ∈ g: ui(g) ≥ ui(g − ij) and
(ii) for all ij /∈ g: if ui(g + ij) > ui(g), then uj(g + ij) < uj(g).
The implicit assumption of network formation underlying this approach to stability is
that players are in control of their links; any player can unilaterally delete a given link, but
to build a link, both involved players need to agree. Thus, two players will form a link if one
is strictly better off and the other is not worse off, while a link is deleted, if at least one of the
two involved players is strictly better off deleting the link. The networks which allow neither
profitable link deletion, nor (mutually) profitable link formation are then pairwise stable.
Pairwise stability is a fairly weak notion of network stability. One common refinement is to
allow for multiple link deletion in (i) which is called Pairwise Nash stability. All our results
are robust to this refinement.9
The analysis of our model demands to distinguish between pairwise stable networks for
which the above conditions hold on a cost interval of positive length and those for which this
is not the case.
Definition 3 (Generic and Nongeneric Pairwise Stability). In the considered framework with
network profit function u = u∗ and linking costs c > 0, a network g is called
• generically pairwise stable if g is pairwise stable for all c′ ∈ (c−ǫ, c+ǫ) for some ǫ > 0,
• nongenerically pairwise stable if g is pairwise stable but not generically pairwise sta-
ble.10
The results we derive in Section 3 will even reveal that networks can be pairwise stable
at no more than a single cost level if they are not generically pairwise stable for any cost
level. Thus, the notion of nongeneric pairwise stability is not robust at all with respect to
changes of linking costs. We are therefore predominantly interested in generically pairwise
stable networks and, in what follows, establish a complete characterization thereof.
3. Stable Networks and Bargaining Outcomes
To characterize stable networks, we first illustrate bargaining outcomes and profits for
the three player case (Section 3.1). We use these observations to derive sufficient conditions
for networks to be pairwise stable as a first step and then gradually rule out a broad range
9We decided to use the weaker notion of Pairwise Stability since the characterization results are therefore
stronger.
10See e.g. Baetz (2015) for a similar definition in a setting of simultaneous choice of links and actions
referred to as “generic equilibrium”.
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of networks from being pairwise stable (Section 3.2) until we arrive at a complete character-
ization of generically pairwise stable networks (Section 3.3). Further, we derive the induced
bargaining outcomes (Section 3.4) and elaborate on the structure of nongenerically pairwise
stable networks (Section 3.5).
3.1. Three Players
To illustrate the model, in particular the bargaining outcomes and the implications for
network formation, we first present the situation for three players. It turns out that this case
already covers many important aspects of the model. Since players are ex-ante homogeneous
such that their names do not matter, there are essentially four different network structures
to consider (disregarding symmetries) displayed in Figure 1.
0
0
00 12 − c
1
2 − c
1
2 − 2c
1
2 − 2c
1
2 − 2c
1
3 − c
1
3 − c
2
3 − 2c
gI gII gIII gIV
Figure 1: A sketch of the four network structures which can arise in the case n = 3 with induced profits
Limit equilibrium payoffs can be calculated as follows. Players who are not connected
always receive payoff 0 from bargaining, but also do not incur any network formation costs.
In the one link network gII , the connected players are in symmetric positions implying limit
equilibrium payoffs of 12 each, which can also be obtained by applying Manea’s algorithm
(Definition 1) since the shortage ratio is unity. Because both players have formed one link in
this network, their profit in the network formation stage is u∗i (gII) =
1
2−c. In contrast, players
in gIII are in asymmetric network positions. The central player acts as a monopolist to the two
peripheral players who depend on the central player to come to an agreement. Therefore,
the two peripheral players are the largest g-independent set M1 minimizing the shortage
ratio which can be calculated to be r1 = |L1|/|M1| =
1
2 . Thus, limit equilibrium payoffs are
v∗i (gIII) = x1 =
r1
1+r1
= 13 for the peripheral players i ∈ M1, implying v
∗
j (gIII) = 1 − x1 =
2
3
for the central player j. Subtracting link formation cost, we get for profits u∗i (gIII) =
1
3 − c
and u∗j (gIII) =
2
3 − 2c, respectively. Finally in the complete network gIV , all players are
in symmetric positions. The only g-independent sets are singleton players for which the
shortage ratio exceeds unity, implying that limit equilibrium payoffs equal 12 with linking
costs 2c, yielding profits of u∗i (gIV ) =
1
2 − 2c, each.
Considering network formation in the first stage, we can calculate the marginal profits
of each link for the involved players. We have u∗i (gII)− u
∗
i (gI) =
1
2 − c for connected players
i in gII , meaning that players have a strict incentive to form a link in the empty network,
if c < 12 . Thus, the empty network is pairwise stable if and only if c ≥
1
2 . Further, we get
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u∗j (gIII)− u
∗
j (gII) =
1
6 − c for the central player j in gIII implying that the connected players
in gII have a weak incentive to form a link with the isolated player if c ≤
1
6 . Since for the
isolated player k in gII marginal utility u
∗
k(gIII)− u
∗
k(gII) =
1
3 − c is strictly positive if c ≤
1
6 ,
network gII is pairwise stable if and only if c ∈ (
1
6 ,
1
2 ]. Finally, we get u
∗
i (gIV )−u
∗
i (gIII) =
1
6−c
for the peripheral players i in gIII . Thus, in order for the peripheral players in gIII not to
have a strict incentive to form the link, we must have c ≥ 16 , while for symmetric reasons to
the considerations above, cost must satisfy c ≤ 16 for the central player in gIII not to have an
incentive to delete the link. Hence, the network gIII is only pairwise stable for a single cost
value c = 16 which means that gIII is nongenerically pairwise stable according to Definition 3.
Finally, the network gIV , which is a circle of odd size in this three player example, is pairwise
stable for c ∈ [0, 16 ].
The example already conveys some of the main insights, as only the empty network
(gI) or networks such that any nonsingleton component is either a separated pair (gII) or
an odd circle (gIV ) can be generically pairwise stable. Payoff from bargaining in generically
pairwise stable networks is always such that nonisolated players receive homogeneous payoffs
of 12 .
11 Other structures (here: gIII) may arise as nongenerically pairwise stable, allowing for
heterogeneous bargaining outcomes.
3.2. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Networks to Be Pairwise Stable
The insights from the three player example can be generalized to an arbitrary number of
players n. We first show that networks for which each component has exactly the observed
characteristics from the three player case are pairwise stable for n ≥ 3.
Theorem 1 (Sufficient Conditions for Networks to Be Pairwise Stable).
(i) The empty network is pairwise stable if c ≥ 12 .
(ii) A network which is a union of separated pairs and not more than one isolated player
is pairwise stable if c ∈ (16 ,
1
2 ].
12 Additionally, if c = 12 , then there can exist more than
one isolated player.
(iii) A network which is a union of odd circles with at most 12c players and either separated
pairs or at most one isolated player is pairwise stable if c ∈ (0, 16 ].
13 Additionally, if
c = 16 and given that there is no isolated player, then there can also exist lines of length
three in a pairwise stable network.14
11Note the relation to equitable networks (Manea, 2011a) which are defined as the networks giving rise to
symmetric limit equilibrium payoffs of 1
2
in the bargaining stage.
12A separated pair denotes a subnetwork induced by a two-player component.
13Here, the union can be exclusive such that a network consisting only of separated pairs or only of (some
of the permissible) odd circles is pairwise stable. A circle with m players or a m-player circle is induced by a
component with cardinality m ≥ 3 such that all players have exactly 2 links. It is called odd if its cardinality
is an odd number.
14A line of length m ≥ 3 denotes a subnetwork induced by a m-player component which can be transformed
to a m-player circle by adding one link.
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The formal proof of this theorem, like all other more evolved and lengthy proofs, is
provided in the appendix. Recalling the three player case, the intuition is quite simple,
however. While incentives to form links observed in the three player case carry over to the
n player case, we establish that links across these components are not profitable for the
involved players which then explains the structure of the stable networks. Therefore, any
network such that each component has the same form as one of the stable structures in the
three player case is pairwise stable. Additionally, components can be odd circles of larger
size for small cost of link formation. The intuition is that link deletion in an odd circle
leaves the two involved players as the end of an odd line. The payoff loss due to link deletion
decreases with the size of the odd circle such that large circles can only be stable for small
costs of link formation.
Theorem 1 above lists some stable networks for the specified cost ranges. Therefore as
a byproduct of Theorem 1, we get existence of a pairwise stable network for any value of
costs c. In priciple, more networks than listed in Theorem 1 may be pairwise stable. In
the remainder of this section, however, we derive necessary conditions that show that the
networks which are not listed in Theorem 1 can at most be nongenerically pairwise stable.
Hence, we show that the networks in Theorem 1 which are stable for a cost interval of positive
length characterize the set of generically pairwise stable networks completely. As a first step,
we can use observations from the proof of Theorem 1 and deductions from the three player
case to rule out some particular network structures from being pairwise stable.
Corollary 1. A network cannot be pairwise stable if it contains
(i) more than one isolated player while c < 12 ,
(ii) a separated pair while c > 12 ,
(iii) a line of length three while c 6= 16 ,
(iv) an odd circle with more than 12c members,
15
(v) an isolated player combined with a separated pair or a line of length three while c ≤ 16 .
Statements (i)–(iv) as well as the first part of Statement (v) of Corollary 1 follow immedi-
ately from what we learned in the three-player case and the proof of Theorem 1. To see that
an isolated player and a line of length three cannot coexist in a pairwise stable network recall
from Section 3.1 that an isolated player receives profit 0 while the two peripheral players in
a line of length three receive 13 − c. If one of these players connects to an isolated player,
then the algorithm A(·) yields that all players in the new component receive a payoff of 12 .
Thus, the isolated player benefits strictly while the peripheral player in the line benefits at
least weakly from the formation of this link for c ≤ 16 .
15In particular, this means that there can be no odd circles at all in pairwise stable networks as long as
c > 1
6
.
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In order to find necessary conditions for networks to be pairwise stable, we proceed with
a simple observation. Consider some network g ∈ G. Recall from Manea’s analysis that a
link ij ∈ g can only lead to an agreement if v∗δi (g)+v
∗δ
j (g) ≤ 1 holds for δ large enough. The
links ij ∈ g such that above does not hold are called disagreement links. From a network
formation perspective, intuition then says that disagreement links are irrelevant regarding
payoffs while being costly and therefore should not form. Since the limit equilibrium network
g∗ of a network g is defined in Manea (2011a) as the network obtained by deleting all
disagreement links from g for δ → 1, above intuition is confirmed in the following result.
Proposition 1. If g is pairwise stable, then g = g∗ and, hence, v∗i (g) + v
∗
j (g) = 1 ∀ij ∈ g.
Proposition 1 will prove to be of great importance for showing that the generically pair-
wise stable networks given in Theorem 1 are the only generically pairwise stable networks.
The subsequent results on necessary conditions for a network to be pairwise stable make
heavily use of the fact that pairwise stable networks cannot contain disagreement links and
that therefore payoffs of connected players must add up to 1.
First, let us observe the implications of Proposition 1 for components in which players
receive homogeneous payoffs. In such a component C, two players i, j ∈ C with ij ∈ g
then must receive v∗i (g) =
1
2 = v
∗
j (g). Recall that the generically pairwise stable networks
in Theorem 1 are all such that nonisolated players receive homogeneous payoffs of 12 in the
bargaining stage as these players are either part of a separated pair or an odd circle. We show
in the following that these are the only possible substructures of pairwise stable networks
giving rise to equal payoffs of 12 . To do so, define the subset N˜(g) := {i ∈ N | v
∗
i (g) =
1
2} as
the subset of players receiving equal payoffs of 12 .
Theorem 2 (Necessary Conditions for Networks to Be Pairwise Stable – Part 1/2). If a
network g is pairwise stable, then for any component C of g it holds that C ∩ N˜(g) ∈ {∅, C}.
If C ∩ N˜(g) = C, then it must be a separated pair or an odd circle.
The proof, which is again relegated to the appendix, makes use of Proposition 1 and
Manea (2011a, Theorem 5). Because by Proposition 1, payoffs of connected players must
add up to one, we get that players receiving a payoff of 12 can only be connected to other
players receiving the same payoff showing the first part of the statement. Moreover, since
the network g|N˜(g) is equitable by definition, we can apply Manea (2011a, Theorem 5) where
it is shown that a network is equitable if and only if it has an edge cover g′ composed of
separated pairs and odd circles. A network g′ is said to be an edge cover of g|N˜(g) if it fulfills
g′ ⊆ g|N˜(g) and no player in N˜(g) is isolated in g
′. Applying Proposition 1 again, this implies
that any player in N˜(g) has an incentive to delete each of her links not contained in g′.
Though statements differ, note that Theorem 2 above is in line with Manea (2011b,
Theorem 1(ii)). The latter establishes that for zero linking costs a network is pairwise
stable if and only if it is equitable and therefore allows for a larger class of pairwise stable
(equitable) networks. Among them, for instance, can be networks containing circles or lines
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of even length or completely connected components of arbitrary size as subnetworks. Many
of these can be ruled out when linking costs are introduced by Theorem 2.
Moreover, as we have seen in Figure 1 and Theorem 1, our model with linking costs
also allows for nonequitable structures to be pairwise stable, such as networks containing
isolated players or the line of length three as a subnetwork. The reasons for the appearance
of these nonequitable structures are twofold: While isolated players can be left out due to
the fact that nonisolated players cannot improve their bargaining payoff by connecting to an
isolated player, we have so far observed nonequitable, component induced subnetworks only
in nongenerically pairwise stable networks. Thus, the networks which induce heterogeneous
payoffs within a component remain to be examined. Straightforwardly, as an implication of
Proposition 1 and by applying the payoff computation rule, we get the following condition
on payoffs for players in these nonequitable components.16
Corollary 2. If a network g is pairwise stable, then for any nonequitable component C of
g, there exists a unique partition M ∪˙ L = C with |M | > |L| and g|M = g|L = ∅ such that
payoffs are given by
v∗i (g) = x for all i ∈M and
v∗j (g) = 1− x for all j ∈ L,
where x = |L||M |+|L| .
If a pairwise stable network contains a nonequitable component, then the component
induced subnetwork and the payoffs of the involved players must be of special structure:
The component induced subnetwork has to be bipartite since by Proposition 1 payoffs of
connected players must add up to one, implying that players receiving the same payoff within
a nonequitable component cannot be neighbors. For given cardinalities of both sides of the
bipartite subnetwork, the admissible payoffs can exactly be calculated by applying Manea’s
algorithm A(g). This has important consequences for the existence of such components when
we take into account cost of link formation. It turns out that, given link formation cost c,
only one payoff pair is feasible in a pairwise stable network, and therefore the structure of
the induced subnetworks is crucially restricted.
Theorem 3 (Necessary Conditions for Networks to Be Pairwise Stable – Part 2/2). If a
network g is pairwise stable, then for any nonequitable component C of g, players obtain
payoffs of either x ∈ (0, 12) or 1− x ∈ (
1
2 , 1) that satisfy
x+ c =
1
2
. (4)
The proof uses two lemmas which are of independent interest. Therefore, the Lemmas
16We speak of a (non)equitable component C if the component induced subnetwork g|C is (non)equitable.
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are stated below while the proof of them is relegated to the appendix. Given these Lemmas,
the proof of Theorem 3 is quite intuitive and shown below the respective Lemmas 1 and 2.
In each nonequitable component of a pairwise stable network, there exist some players
receiving payoff x < 12 and some players receiving payoff 1−x >
1
2 by Corollary 2. Lemma 1
then deals with players receiving a payoff x < 12 . It is shown that if two such players connect
or one such player connects to an isolated player, then they each receive a payoff equal to
1
2 . Note that for both Lemmas 1 and 2, we have in mind that in a pairwise stable network
restricted to a nonequitable component, the algorithm A(g) stops after one step. This is due
to the fact that according to Manea (2011a, Proposition 3), the sequence of minimal shortage
ratios provided by the algorithm in Definition 1 is strictly increasing for any network. Since
only two distinct payoffs can occur when restricted to a component of a pairwise stable
network by Corollary 2, we cannot have more than one iteration of the algorithm.
Lemma 1. If a network g is pairwise stable and the algorithm A(g) provides (r1, x1,M1, L1,
N1, g1), i.e. s¯ = 1, such that r1 ∈ (0, 1), then for all i, j ∈M1 it is
v∗i (g + ij) = v
∗
j (g + ij) =
1
2
.
Further, if the player set N = {1, ..., n} is extended by an isolated player n+1 such that the
network g remains unchanged, it similarly is v∗i (g + i(n+ 1)) = v
∗
n+1(g + i(n+ 1)) =
1
2 .
Having characterized the marginal payoffs of players receiving payoff x < 12 , Lemma 2
then deals with players in nonequitable components of a pairwise stable network receiving
payoffs 1 − x > 12 . It is shown that it is not possible to reduce these players’ payoffs below
1
2 by the deletion of a link. At the same time, the payoff of players receiving x <
1
2 cannot
be increased to more than 12 by link deletion.
Lemma 2. If a network g is pairwise stable and the algorithm A(g) provides (r1, x1,M1, L1,
N1, g1), i.e. s¯ = 1, such that r1 ∈ (0, 1), then for all j ∈ L1, i ∈M1 and kl ∈ g it is
v∗j (g − kl) ≥
1
2
≥ v∗i (g − kl).
The proofs of these lemmas are somewhat lengthy and as usual provided in the appendix.
In both cases we show that, if the respective statement were not true, then this would imply
that the player set is infinite. To arrive at this contradiction, we make use of an additional,
rather technical lemma which we also provide in the appendix (see Lemma 3). Based on
these lemmas, the proof of the theorem can be obtained straightforwardly.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let g be a pairwise stable network inducing heterogeneous payoffs
within some component C ⊆ N . Let g′ := g|C . According to Corollary 2, the algorithm
A(g′) (with N1 = C) has to stop after the first step, i.e. s¯
′ = 1. Let (r′1, x
′
1,M
′
1, L
′
1, N
′
1, g
′
1)
be the outcome of A(g′) and i ∈ M ′1, j ∈ L
′
1. Then, v
∗
i (g) = x
′
1 =
|L′1|
|M ′
1
|+|L′
1
| ∈ (0,
1
2) and
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v∗j (g) = 1 − x
′
1 =
|M ′1|
|M ′
1
|+|L′
1
| ∈ (
1
2 , 1). For g to be pairwise stable, it must not be mutually
profitable for i, k ∈M ′1 to create a link, which by Lemma 1 implies that
x′1 − ηi(g
′)c ≥
1
2
− (ηi(g
′) + 1)c ⇔ x′1 + c ≥
1
2
.
Similarly, it must not be profitable to delete a link for j ∈ L′1, which by Lemma 2 implies
that
(1− x′1)− ηj(g
′)c ≥
1
2
− (ηj(g
′)− 1)c ⇔ x′1 + c ≤
1
2
.
Thus, v∗i (g) = x
′
1 =
1
2 − c and v
∗
j (g) = 1 − x
′
1 =
1
2 + c. Obviously, this has to hold for
all components of g in which players receive heterogeneous payoffs implying the result by
component decomposability.
Because by Lemma 1 players in unfavorable bargaining positions in nonequitable com-
ponents gain exactly 12 − x if they connect to each other, cost must exceed the marginal
profit of such a link for the network to be pairwise stable. On the other hand, since by
Lemma 2 players with highest bargaining power in such components do not lose more than
1− x− 12 when deleting a link, cost must be below the marginal profit of such a link for the
network to be pairwise stable. Hence, payoffs in nonequitable components and thereby also
the structure of these are uniquely determined by cost c. Notice also, by considering the
limit case c→ 0, that Theorem 3 is in line with Manea (2011b, Theorem 1) stating that, for
zero linking costs, any pairwise stable network must be equitable.
3.3. A Complete Characterization of Generically Pairwise Stable Networks
We are now in a position to put all our results on necessary conditions for pairwise stable
networks together to find that those networks in Theorem 1 which are stable for a cost
interval of positive length are the only networks which can be generically pairwise stable.
Therefore we arrive at a complete characterization of generically pairwise stable networks.
Corollary 3 (Complete Characterization). A network is generically pairwise stable if and
only if it is either
(i) the empty network, or
(ii) a union of separated pairs, odd circles and at most one isolated player such that an
isolated player only appears if either all other components are separated pairs or all
other components are odd circles.
In particular, no network other than the ones provided in Theorem 1 is generically pairwise
stable for the respective cost level.
The appearance of pairs and odd circles and the admissible size of odd circles depend
on the cost of link formation given in Theorem 1. Note that for any given size of an odd
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circle, it is always possible to find a cost interval of positive length such that the network
is pairwise stable by Theorem 1. To see that no other networks can be generically pairwise
stable, note that by Theorem 2 any equitable component must be an odd circle or a separated
pair. Corollary 1 together with Theorem 2 then implies that any pairwise stable network
not captured by Theorem 1 must contain a nonequitable component.
For pairwise stable networks containing nonequitable components, the payoff distribution
of players within the nonequitable component is uniquely determined by the exogenously
given cost level c, see Theorem 3. At the same time, the component induced subnetwork
must be bipartite such the sizes of both sides of the bipartite network are also uniquely by
c due to Corollary 2. Hence, a perturbation of c yields different conditions for these group
sizes, implying that if a pairwise stable network contains a nonequitable component, then it
is pairwise stable only for a single cost value. In other words, all pairwise stable networks
containing nonequitable components are nongenerically pairwise stable. Hence, the networks
in Corollary 3 completely characterize the set of generically pairwise stable networks.
Beyond that, given the crucial cost level c = 12 − x, it is not at all clear that a network
in which each player receives a payoff of x ∈ (0, 12) or 1−x is actually pairwise stable. First,
c must be a rational number, as otherwise the shortage ratio cannot meet the condition on
payoffs. Rational numbers also put restrictive conditions on the number of players n for
existence. Hence, the emergence of networks with nonequitable components is very unlikely.
Second, nongenerically pairwise stable networks are less stable from another perspective: Any
two players on the short side of the market receiving payoff x must be indifferent between
leaving the network unchanged and adding a mutual link (see Lemma 1). Also, any player
receiving a payoff of 1−x must be indifferent between keeping and deleting any one link (see
Lemma 2). Therefore, networks which do not have the structure as given in Corollary 3, are
neither robust to perturbation of the cost level nor are they robust to perturbation of best
responses in network formation. In that sense, generically pairwise stable networks are the
likely outcome of a network formation game prior to a Manea (2011a) bargaining game.
3.4. Induced Bargaining Outcomes
In the previous sections, we have derived necessary conditions for pairwise stability and
completely characterized generically pariwise stable networks. Although we already discussed
implications for the bargaining outcome, it is worthwhile to summarize them. As our second
main result, we straightforwardly conclude that payoffs and profits induced by (generically)
pairwise stable networks are in general highly but not completely homogeneous.
Corollary 4 (Limited Outcome Diversity). Consider a pairwise stable network g.
(i) If g is generically pairwise stable for c > 12 , then all players receive v
∗
i (g) = u
∗
i (g) = 0.
(ii) If g is generically pairwise stable for c < 12 , then all nonisolated players receive payoff
v∗i (g) =
1
2 while there can be at most one isolated player receiving a payoff v
∗
j (g) = 0.
Profits satisfy u∗i (g) ∈ P (g) for all i ∈ N where P (g) ⊂ {0,
1
2 − 2c,
1
2 − c} with |P (g)| ≤
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2. Players in odd circles obtain u∗i (g) =
1
2 − 2c while players in separated pairs get
u∗i (g) =
1
2 − c and isolated players receive u
∗
i (g) = 0
(iii) If g is nongenerically pairwise stable, bargaining payoffs of players are such that either
v∗i (g) ∈ {
1
2−c,
1
2 ,
1
2+c}, or v
∗
i (g) ∈ {0,
1
2} for all i ∈ N . The former case of nonequitable
components only exists if c ∈ (0, 14 ].
The first and second part of Corollary 4 follow straightforwardly from our complete
characterization of generically pairwise stable networks (see Corollary 3) and the fact that
players in odd circles and separated pairs receive payoff v∗i (g) =
1
2 . It implies that in the
most likely result of network formation, i.e. in generically pairwise stable networks, all players
(except possibly one) receive the same payoff: in the empty network all receive v∗i (g) = 0
while in all other generically pairwise stable networks at most one gets v∗i (g) = 0 while all
others receive v∗i (g) =
1
2 in the bargaining stage. Profits in the network formation stage may
however differ. While players in odd circles maintain two links, players in separated pairs
have only formed one link and therefore only incur half the linking costs while receiving the
same payoff from bargaining. In that sense, separated pairs are the efficient outcome and
odd circles only form because of the myopic nature of link formation assumed in the notion
of pairwise stability.
Additionally to these considerations, nonequitable components can exist as part of non-
generically pairwise stable networks allowing for slightly more diverse bargaining outcomes.
Corollary 4(iii) further states that isolated players receiving payoff 0 cannot coexist with
nonequitable components in (nongenerically) pairwise stable network. The intuition is that
in such a structure, an isolated player has a strict incentive to add a link while a player
in a nonequitable component receiving v∗i (g) =
1
2 − c is indifferent between connecting to
the isolated player or not (recall Lemma 1). A similar intuition is discussed for part (v) of
Corollary 1. Moreover, Corollary 4(iii) states that nonequitable components can only exist if
c ≤ 14 . The reason is that players in nonequitable components receiving payoffs v
∗
i (g) =
1
2−c
have at least one link which is costly. Deleting a link to j ∈ Ni(g) would not lower payoffs
from bargaining below 0, i.e. v∗i (g− ij) ≥ 0, meaning that marginal profit of the link ij is at
most 12 − c− c which is negative for c >
1
4 contradicting pairwise stability.
Taken together, we have that the diversity of possible bargaining outcomes gets narrowed
down substantially compared to the work of Manea (2011a) if one considers a preceding stage
of costly strategic network formation. If all networks were possible, one could obtain any
rational number from the interval [0, 1) as a payoff induced by an appropriate network on a
sufficiently large player set in Manea’s basic framework with δ → 1.17 Strategic network for-
mation rules out most of these networks. However, compared to Manea (2011b, Theorem 1)
a larger diversity of bargaining outcomes is possible when link formation is costly.
17For the rational number n
′
n′′
∈ [0, 1) with n′, n′′ ∈ N, consider the player set N with n = n′′ and the
complete bipartite network with n′ players on one side and n′′ − n′ players on the other side. Then the
algorithm A(·) yields payoffs n
′′−n′
n′′
and n
′
n′′
.
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3.5. Nongenerically Pairwise Stable Networks
Although nongenerically pairwise stable networks do not seem to be a very likely outcome
when network formation is considered in the first stage, we complete our analysis by studying
these networks. First, note that for c > 12 no nongenerically pairwise stable network exists
as the unique pairwise stable network is the empty network which is generically pairwise
stable.18 Some nongenerically pairwise stable networks are already given in Theorem 1.
For c = 12 more than one isolated players and separated pairs may coexist since players
are indifferent between forming a link or not. For c < 12 , a nongenerically pairwise stable
network g must contain at least one nonequitable components by our previous results. Each
such nonequitable component C must be bipartite, i.e. consist of two g-independent sets M
and L with M ∪˙L = C satisfying |L||M |+|L| =
1
2 − c, see Theorem 3. For the derivation of
this, we only used the fact that in a pairwise stable network, both link addition between two
players in the set M and link deletion by a player in L cannot be profitable. Considering
both the incentives of players in M and L for link deletion in more detail, leads to further
restrictions on the structure of nonequitable components. To be more precise, we establish
that a nonequitable component cannot be a tree19 (except for the three player tree considered
in Theorem 1), cannot contain a cycle20 with a cut-player on the strong side of the market
L, and has to satisfy further conditions as stated below. For a given network g, a player
k ∈ N is called cut-player if g|N\{k} has more components than g.
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Proposition 2. If a network g is nongenerically pairwise stable and c < 12 , then g contains
at least one nonequitable component of at least three players. Every such component C is
bipartite and consists of g-independent sets M,L ⊂ C with M ∪˙L = C, satisfying |L||M |+|L| =
1
2 − c such that the following has to hold:
(i) C cannot be a tree of more than three players.
(ii) C cannot contain a cycle which encompasses a cut-player in L.
(iii) |M | ≤ 3|L|.
(iv) For all i ∈ M , j ∈ L with ij ∈ g there exists M ′ ⊂ M and corresponding partner
set L′ := Lg−ij(M ′) ⊂ L in g − ij with i ∈ M ′ and M ′ ∩ Nj(g) = {i} such that for
m′ = |M ′| and l′ = |L′|, we have
c ≤ min
{
1
2
(
1
2 −
l′
l′+m′
)
, m
′
(m′+l′)2+(m′+l′)
}
.
18To see this most easily, note that for any pairwise stable network g and a player i receiving v∗i (g) >
1
2
,
marginal payoff of any link satisfies v∗i (g) − v
∗
i (g − ij) <
1
2
by Lemma 2. Thus, any link will be deleted as
cost of the link exceeds any additional payoff.
19A tree denotes a component-induced subnetwork which is minimally connected.
20A cycle is a path from a player i to itself.
21This notation comes from graph theory where vertices of that kind are typically called “cut-vertices” (see
e.g. West, 2001). For instance, each player contained in a component which induces a tree and having more
than one link is a cut-player.
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The result restricts the set of nonequitable components that can be part of a pairwise
stable network. Except for the line of three players (see Figure 1, network gIII), no other
trees can be component induced. Hence, all other nonequitable components of pairwise
stable networks have to contain cycles. By Proposition 2(ii), such a cycle cannot encompass
a cut-player in L. Thus, there cannot exist a loose-end player i ∈ M whose single neighbor
is part of a cycle.22 Proposition 2(ii), however, is more general than just excluding loose-end
players in M . Some examples of network structures that cannot be pairwise stable due to
Proposition 2(ii) are illustrated in Figure 2 where gV contains a loose-end player and in gVI
the central player is a cut-player.
gV gVI
Figure 2: A sketch of networks which cannot be pairwise stable according to Proposition 2(ii)
Further, Proposition 2(iii) establishes that too unbalanced bipartite structures with re-
spect to the sizes of the independent sets cannot be pairwise stable. The rather unintuitive
part (iv) simply implies that the bipartite component cannot have too many links. This fol-
lows from the fact that every link contained in the bipartite component must yield positive
marginal payoff exceeding the cost of link formation. That means that after the deletion
of a link ij ∈ g, player i ∈ M (and also j) incurs a payoff loss such that the algorithm
A(g − ij) must detect a smaller shortage ratio L
′
M ′
< L
M
in the first step with i ∈ M ′ and
j /∈ L′ since nothing else has changed. From j /∈ L′ it then follows that Nj(g− ij)∩M
′ = ∅.
The condition on c in Proposition 2(iv) ensures that payoff loss due to link deletion is large
enough. Two networks which are captured by Proposition 2(iv) and can therefore not be
pairwise stable are pictured in Figure 3. To see this, pick a link ij ∈ gVII , and consider some
set M ′ ⊂M with i ∈M ′. Then for M ′ 6= {i} we have M ′∩Nj(g) 6= {i} and for M
′ = {i} we
get 12(
1
2−
l′
l′+m′ ) = 0 and hence the network cannot be pairwise stable. Similar considerations
hold for some links in gVIII as it contains gVII .
gVII gVIII
Figure 3: A sketch of networks which cannot be pairwise stable according to Proposition 2(iv)
22Also note that no player j ∈ L can be a loose-end since otherwise L−j := L \ {j} and M−j := M \Nj(g)
result in smaller shortage ratio L
−j
M−j
< L
M
.
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Though a further generalization is not reached here, Proposition 2 rules out many net-
works from being even nongenerically pairwise stable. It remains as a conjecture that the
only nongenerically pairwise stable networks inducing heterogeneous payoffs within a com-
ponent are those containing a line of length three at cost level c = 16 .
4. Discussion and Conclusion
With this paper we contribute to the study of endogenously generated market structures.
To model market interaction we employ Manea’s (2011a) seminal approach to bargaining on
networks. While Manea (2011a) characterizes bargaining outcomes for any exogenously given
network, the focus of our paper is to determine which networks actually arise when incentives
to form costly links are determined by the bargaining game. Thereby we are able to draw
conclusions about the induced bargaining outcome when ex ante homogeneous players form
a network resulting in possibly heterogeneous bargaining positions.
Although the bargaining outcome in Manea (2011a) depends in a nontrivial way on the
network structure and can only be computed via an algorithm, we arrive at an analytically
tractable model of strategic network formation. Considering infinitely patient players, we
completely characterize the set of generically pairwise stable networks. These are the most
likely outcome of network formation as nongenerically pairwise stable networks are neither
robust to changes in costs nor to perturbation of best replies.
Nonempty generically pairwise stable networks consist of specific unions of separated
pairs, odd circles, and at most one isolated player, where the particular structure depends
on the level of linking costs as shown in Theorem 1. The induced bargaining outcomes are
homogeneous since all nonisolated players receive equal payoff of 12 in the bargaining stage. In
this sense the networks restricted to nonisolated players are equitable although players may
incur different network formation costs. Our results are therefore complementary to Manea
(2011b) where network formation without costs is studied. Although the implications for
the bargaining outcomes are similar, the resulting network structures differ as only certain
substructures, i.e. skeletons, of Manea’s stable networks remain. At the same time, contrary
to Manea’s result, players may stay isolated in generically pairwise stable networks when
network formation is costly. Moreover, nongenerically pairwise stable networks may arise
resulting in heterogeneous bargaining outcomes in our model.
Our results may be extended with respect to several considerations.23 First, to model net-
work formation, we have only used the notion of pairwise stability by Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996). This approach to stability uses a very weak notion of stability as links are considered
one by one. However, it is straightforward to see that generically pairwise stable networks
are also robust to multiple link deletion as no player has more than two links and deleting
both would leave them with zero profits. Thus, the complete characterization of generically
pairwise stable networks extends to a characterization of generically pairwise Nash stable
23The extensions are discussed in more details in Gauer (2016), Sections 3.4 and 3.5.
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networks. Second, one may also consider the implications for welfare. Since network forma-
tion is costly and at most n2 units of surplus can be generated, efficient networks are either
the empty network or separated pairs (if n is even) since the maximal amount of surplus
is generated with minimal network formation cost. We can conclude that efficient networks
are always generically pairwise stable in our model (if n is even) and, moreover, uniquely
pairwise stable if costs are large enough. Finally, abstracting from the limit case δ → 1,
other networks may be generically pairwise stable. To see that, consider, for instance, very
low costs c and impatient players, such that δ is bounded away from 1. In this case all links
may yield a strictly positive marginal payoff since all links have a positive probability of
being selected in the first stage resulting in the stability of the complete network.
Future research may consider network formation with respect to other types of market
interaction. In the framework of Manea (2011a), the effect of allowing discounting may have
interesting effects as pointed out above. Also, ex ante heterogeneity with respect to costs of
link formation or patience may be explored. Relaxing the assumption of network stationarity
would move beyond the approach of Manea (2011a) and may prove to be not as tractable as
our approach (cf. e.g. Abreu and Manea, 2012a,b). More recent papers also study issues of
resale and intermediation in networks (Manea, forthcoming) or bilateral trading in networks
(Condorelli and Galeotti, forthcoming). Studying network formation prior to these types of
market interaction may also be a worthy endeavor.
Appendix
A. Proofs
A.1. Proof of Theorem 1
Consider a component C ⊆ N of some network g which induces a circle or a separated
pair. Then in both cases it is impossible to find a g-independent subset M ⊆ C such that for
the corresponding partner set we have |Lg(M)| < |M |. Hence, the algorithm A(g) yields a
payoff of 12 for each player contained in C in both cases (recall Definition 1 and the subsequent
payoff computation rule). Now consider two players i, j ∈ N with ij /∈ g where
(a) both are contained in the same component inducing an odd circle,
(b) they are contained in different components each inducing an odd circle,
(c) they are contained in different components each inducing a separated pair,
(d) one is contained in a component inducing an odd circle and the other one is contained
in a component inducing a separated pair, or
(e) one is contained in a component inducing an odd circle and the other one is an isolated
player.
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Then in each of these cases the algorithm A(g + ij) again yields a payoff of 12 for all players
contained in the new component Ci(g + ij) = Cj(g + ij). The best way to see this is again
to consider Definition 1 and the subsequent payoff computation rule.24 Therefore, at least
one of the two players i and j (in Cases (a)–(d) even both) will receive an unchanged payoff
after having established this link. Regarding profits this means, however, that this player is
worse off as she has to bear additional linking costs of c > 0. Thus, the respective link will
never be formed.
Next, recall the three-player case. From this it is straightforward to see that Part (i) of
the theorem is indeed true. Also, we can deduce that a pairwise stable network can contain
both an isolated player and a separated pair if we have linking costs c ∈ (16 ,
1
2 ]. Together
with the above Case (c) this establishes Part (ii) of the theorem.
Consider again a network g and now two players i′, j′ ∈ N with i′j′ ∈ g. Moreover, assume
that these players are contained in a component C which induces an odd circle with m ≥ 3
players. We already know that g induces a payoff of 12 for both players. Now consider the
network g′ := g− i′j′ which is obviously a line of length m. Let (r′s, x
′
s,M
′
s, L
′
s, N
′
s, g
′
s)s=1,...,s¯′
be the outcome of A(g′) (with N1 = C).
25 As m is an odd number, we have that s¯′ = 1 and
i′, j′ ∈M ′1. Further, it is |M
′
1| =
m+1
2 and |L
′
1| =
m−1
2 which implies that v
∗
i′(g
′) = v∗j′(g
′) =
x′1 =
m−1
2m . As a stability condition this gives
u∗i′(g)− u
∗
i′(g
′) =
1
2
− 2c−
(m− 1
2m
− c
)
≥ 0 ⇔
1
2m
≥ c ⇔ m ≤
1
2c
.
Of course, the same holds for player j′. Together with the above Cases (a) and (b) this means
that a network which is composed of odd circles is pairwise stable if and only if each circle
has at most 12c members. Note that a pairwise stable network can therefore contain odd
circles only if we have c ≤ 16 since a circle must have at least three members by definition.
Furthermore, observe that for the cost range c ∈ (0, 16 ] we have
1
2 − c > 0 which means
that no player contained in a component inducing a separated pair has incentives to delete
her link. This together with the above Cases (c)–(e) gives that, potentially besides one or
several odd circles with a permissible number of players, a network being pairwise stable at
c ∈ (0, 16 ] can contain separated pairs or one isolated player. As we know from the three-
player case, however, an isolated player and a separated pair cannot coexist in a pairwise
stable network at these levels of linking costs. This proves the first statement in Part (iii).
Finally, consider the transition point c = 16 . In what follows, let the network g be
composed of two lines of length three, an odd circle, and a separated pair as sketched in
Figure A.4.
24However, a shortcut would be to consider Manea (2011a, Theorem 5) which we make use of when proving
our Theorem 2.
25Disregarding players in C∁ is w.l.o.g. as the profile of payoffs respectively profits is component-
decomposable.
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12 3
4 5
6
Figure A.4: A sketch of a network g containing lines of length three
W.l.o.g. we focus on the labeled players 1, 2, ..., 6. At c = 16 the algorithm A(g) yields
the following profits:
u∗1(g) =
2
3
− 2c =
1
3
, u∗2(g) = u
∗
3(g) =
1
3
− c =
1
6
, u∗6(g) =
1
2
− 2c =
1
6
Based on this, we are able to establish that link addition either leads to a worsening for
at least one of the two players or both are indifferent. Specifically, applying the respective
algorithm gives
u∗2(g + 23) = u
∗
3(g + 23) =
1
2
− 2c =
1
6
= u∗2(g) = u
∗
3(g),
u∗1(g + 13) = u
∗
1(g + 14) = u
∗
1(g + 15) = u
∗
1(g + 16) =
2
3
− 3c =
1
6
<
1
3
= u∗1(g),
u∗2(g + 25) =
2
5
− 2c =
1
15
<
1
6
= u∗2(g),
u∗6(g + 26) =
1
2
− 3c = 0 <
1
6
= u∗6(g).
Since we know from the three-player case that within the component of a line of length three
there are no incentives to add or delete a link at this cost level, this concludes the proof of
Part (iii) and of the theorem.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 1
Consider a network g′ ∈ G which contains disagreement links such that g′ \ g′∗ 6= ∅ and
further assume that every player has at least one link in g′ implying that every player has
at least one link in g′∗ (see Manea, 2011a, Lemma 1).26 W.l.o.g. let 12 ∈ g′ \ g′∗ and denote
g := g′−12 implying g′∗ ⊆ g. For both networks consider the outcome of the algorithms A(g)
denoted by (rs, xs,Ms, Ls, Ns, gs)s=1,...,s¯ and A(g
′) denoted by (r′s, x
′
s,M
′
s, L
′
s, N
′
s, g
′
s)s=1,...,s¯′ .
We first note the following properties of g, g′ and g′∗.
P.1 If ij ∈ g, then v∗i (g
′) + v∗j (g
′) ≥ 1, and if ij ∈ g′∗, then v∗i (g
′∗) + v∗j (g
′∗) = 1 (since
ij ∈ g ⇒ ij ∈ g′, compare to Manea, 2011a, Proposition 2).
P.2 For all g′∗-independent sets M the equilibrium payoffs satisfy (by Manea, 2011a, The-
orem 3):
min
i∈M
v∗i (g
′) ≤ |L
g′∗(M)|
|M |+|Lg
′∗
(M)|
, max
j∈Lg
′∗
(M)
v∗j (g
′) ≥ |M |
|M |+|Lg
′∗
(M)|
.
26This is w.l.og. since we can disregard isolated players who do not affect payoffs of other players by
component decomposability.
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We show that A(g′) yields the same outcome as A(g). To see this, we can simply follow the
proof steps for the payoff computation rule in Theorem 4 in Manea (2011a). Let s < s¯ and
suppose we have shown that the outcomes of A(g) and A(g′) are identical up to s− 1.27
Let x′s := mini∈Ns v
∗
i (g
′). Completely analogously to the proof of Claim 4.1 in Manea
(2011a), we can first show that x′s ≤ xs by contradiction. Supposing x
′
s > xs, we get by
Proposition 3 in Manea (2011a), induction hypothesis, and P.1 that Lg
′∗
(Ms) ⊆ L
gs(Ms) =
Ls. Since Ms is g-independent and g
′∗ ⊆ g, Ms is also g
′∗-independent, and, hence, applying
P.2 we receive x′s = mini∈Ns v
∗
i (g
′) ≤ mini∈Ms v
∗
i (g
′) ≤ |L
g′∗(Ms)|
|Ms|+|Lg
′∗
(Ms)|
≤ |Ls||Ms|+|Ls| = xs,
contradicting xs < x
′
s.
Thus, we have r′s < 1 and, hence s < s¯
′. We then get from Theorem 4 in Manea (2011a)
that x′s = x
′
s, M
′
s = argmini∈Ns v
∗
i (g
′) and M ′s is g
′
s-independent and L
′
s = L
g′s(M ′s). Since
gs ⊆ g
′
s implying L
′
s = L
g′s(M ′s) ⊇ L
gs(M ′s), we get x
′
s =
|L′s|
|L′s|+|M
′
s|
≥ |L
gs (M ′s)|
|Lgs (M ′s)|+|M
′
s|
and, thus,
x′s
1−x′s
≥ |L
gs (M ′s)|
|M ′s|
. But, rs minimizes the shortage ratio in gs and M
′
s is also gs-independent
since gs ⊆ g
′
s. Therefore,
xs
1−xs
= rs ≤
|Lgs (M ′s)|
|M ′s|
and hence, xs ≤ x
′
s.
We conclude, xs = x
′
s and thereby rs =
|Lgs (Ms)|
|Ms|
= |L
gs (M ′s)|
|M ′s|
= |L
g′s (M ′s)|
|M ′s|
= r′s. Further,
as Lgs(M ′s) ⊆ L
g′s(M ′s) = L
′
s, and
|Lgs (M ′s)|
|M ′s|
= |L
g′s (M ′s)|
|M ′s|
, we must have Lgs(M ′s) = L
′
s.
Since M ′s is gs−independent and Ms is the union of all gs−independent sets minimizing
the shortage ratio in gs, we get M
′
s ⊆ Ms. To show that M
′
s = Ms, we follow the reasoning
of the proof of Claim 4.4 in Manea (2011a). To get a contradiction, assume Ms \M
′
s 6= ∅.
Applying Lemma 4 in Manea (2011a) to g and P.1 to g′∗, we can conclude analogously that
|Lg
′∗
(Ms \ M
′
s)| ≤ |Ls \ L
′
s|. Since L
′
s = L
g′s(M ′s) = L
gs(M ′s) ⊆ L
gs(Ms) = Ls, we get
|Ls \ L
′
s| = |Ls| − |L
′
s| = rs (|Ms| − |M
′
s|), where the last equality is due to rs =
|Ls|
|Ms|
=
|L′s|
|M ′s|
and |Ms| 6= |M
′
s|. Since Ms \M
′
s is g
′∗-independent, we can again use P.2 to get that
mini∈Ms\M ′s v
∗
i (g
′) ≤ |L
g′∗(Ms\M ′s)|
|Ms\M ′s|+|L
g′∗ (Ms\M ′s)|
≤ |Ls|−|L
′
s|
|Ms|−|M ′s|+|Ls|−|L
′
s|
= rs1+rs = xs, contradicting
v∗i (g
′) > xs for all i ∈ Ns \M
′
s. Thus, A(g) and A(g
′) yield the same outcome for all s < s¯.
Finally, v∗k(g
′) = 12 for all k ∈ Ns¯ (if nonempty). This is because v
∗
k(g) =
1
2 for all k ∈ Ns¯
and gs¯ ⊆ g
′
s¯ implying that for any g
′
s¯-independent set M , 1 ≤
|Lgs¯ (M)|
|M | ≤
|Lg
′
s¯ (M)|
|M | .
Altogether we get that v∗i (g) = v
∗
i (g
′) for all i ∈ N . Since 12 is costly, we therefore get
u1(g
′) − u1(g) = u2(g
′) − u2(g) = −c implying that g
′ cannot be pairwise stable. Thus, for
any pairwise stable g, we get g = g∗, and, hence, v∗i (g) + v
∗
j (g) = 1 for all ij ∈ g by Manea
(2011a), Proposition 2.
A.3. Proof of Theorem 2
Consider a pairwise stable network g and assume that g|N˜(g) is not a union of separated
pairs and odd circles. Notice that due to Proposition 1 for any component C ⊆ N of g
it must either be C ⊆ N˜(g) or C ⊆ N˜(g)∁. Furthermore, recall that the profile of payoffs
27For s = 1 all the assumptions used in the inductive step are satisfied, see Manea (2011a), Footnote 17.
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is component-decomposable, meaning that v∗i (g) = v
∗
i (g|N˜(g)) for all i ∈ N˜(g). Thus, the
network g|N˜(g) is equitable such that by Manea (2011a, Theorem 5) respectively by Berge
(1981) it has a so called edge cover composed of separated pairs and odd circles. This means
that there exists a union of separated pairs and odd circles g′ ⊆ g|N˜(g) such that no player
i ∈ N˜(g) is isolated in g′. By assumption there must exist a link ij ∈ g|N˜(g)\g
′. Obviously,
the network g′ is also an edge cover of the network g|N˜(g) − ij. Again from Manea (2011a,
Theorem 5) respectively from Berge (1981) it then follows that g|N˜(g) − ij is still equitable.
Hence, recalling the implication of Proposition 1 mentioned above, this gives
u∗i (g) = v
∗
i (g|N˜(g))− ηi(g|N˜(g))c =
1
2
− ηi(g|N˜(g))c <
1
2
−
(
ηi(g|N˜(g))− 1
)
c
= v∗i
(
g|N˜(g) − ij
)
− ηi
(
g|N˜(g) − ij
)
c
= u∗i (g − ij).
Thus, arriving at a contradiction, this concludes the proof.
A.4. Proof of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2
As announced in Section 3, the proofs of both lemmas rest on another rather technical
lemma which be provide and prove first.
Lemma 3. Let g˜ be a network with A(g˜) providing (r˜s, x˜s, M˜s, L˜s, N˜s, g˜s)s. For any step
s < s¯ and any set I ⊆ N the following implications must apply:
(i) 1 ≤ |M˜s ∩ I| ≤ |L˜s ∩ I| ⇒ |L
g˜s(L˜s ∩ I) ∩ M˜s ∩ I
∁| ≥ 1,
(ii) 1 ≤ |M˜s ∩ I| < |L˜s ∩ I| ⇒ |L
g˜s(L˜s ∩ I) ∩ M˜s ∩ I
∁| ≥ 2.
Proof of Lemma 3. We prove the two parts of the lemma one after the other.
Part (i):
Assume that we have 1 ≤ |M˜s ∩ I| ≤ |L˜s ∩ I| and L
g˜s(L˜s ∩ I) ∩ M˜s ∩ I
∁ = ∅ for some step
s < s¯ and some set I ⊆ N . Recalling Definition 1, this obviously implies
|L˜s|
|M˜s|
= r˜s < 1 ≤
|L˜s ∩ I|
|M˜s ∩ I|
.
Additionally, we have that M˜s = (M˜s∩I) ∪˙ (M˜s\I) and L˜s = (L˜s∩I) ∪˙ (L˜s\I). This induces
that M˜s\I 6= ∅ since it is |M˜s ∩ I| ≤ |L˜s ∩ I| ≤ |L˜s| but |M˜s| > |L˜s|. It follows that
|L˜s\I|
|M˜s\I|
<
|L˜s|
|M˜s|
.
Moreover, it is Lg˜s(M˜s\I) ⊆ L˜s\I since by assumption L
g˜s(L˜s∩I)∩M˜s ⊆ I. Taken together,
this then gives
|Lg˜s(M˜s\I)|
|M˜s\I|
≤
|L˜s\I|
|M˜s\I|
<
|L˜s|
|M˜s|
= r˜s,
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which contradicts the minimality of r˜s.
Part (ii):
It remains to show that having 1 ≤ |M˜s ∩ I| < |L˜s ∩ I| and |L
g˜s(L˜s ∩ I) ∩ M˜s ∩ I
∁| = 1 in
some step s < s¯ and for some set I ⊆ N leads to a contradiction as well. In such a situation,
slightly different from Part (i), we have
|L˜s|
|M˜s|
= r˜s < 1 ≤
|L˜s ∩ I|
|M˜s ∩ I|+ 1
.
Again, it holds that M˜s = (M˜s ∩ I) ∪˙ (M˜s\I) and L˜s = (L˜s ∩ I) ∪˙ (L˜s\I), which in this case
even guarantees that |M˜s\I| ≥ 2 since it is |M˜s ∩ I| < |L˜s ∩ I| ≤ |L˜s|, but |M˜s| > |L˜s|. This
gives
|L˜s\I|
|M˜s\I| − 1
<
|L˜s|
|M˜s|
.
Moreover, we have that there exists exactly one player i˜ ∈ Lg˜s(L˜s ∩ I) ∩ M˜s ∩ I
∁. Similarly
to Part (i) this implies that it is Lg˜s(M˜s\(I ∪˙ {˜i})) ⊆ L˜s\I, which combined with the above
leads to
|Lg˜s(M˜s\(I ∪˙ {˜i}))|
|M˜s\(I ∪˙ {˜i})|
≤
|L˜s\I|
|M˜s\I| − 1
<
|L˜s|
|M˜s|
= r˜s,
which again contradicts the minimality of r˜s.
Now, we can turn to the proof of the first of the two lemmas which are stated in Section
3.
Proof of Lemma 1. For i, j ∈ M1 consider the network g
′ := g + ij. Let
(r′s, x
′
s,M
′
s, L
′
s, N
′
s, g
′
s)s=1,...,s¯′ be the outcome of A(g
′). Assume for contradiction that there
exists a step sˆ ∈ {1, ..., s¯′ − 1} such that L1 ∩M
′
s = M1 ∩ L
′
s = ∅ for all s ∈ {1, ..., sˆ − 1}
but M1 ∩ L
′
sˆ 6= ∅. Note that L1 ∩M
′
sˆ 6= ∅ would also entail M1 ∩ L
′
sˆ 6= ∅. This is because
any player contained in L1 ∩M
′
sˆ must have a neighbor k ∈ M1 in g due to the minimality
of r1 < 1 and it can obviously neither be k ∈ L
′
s nor k ∈ M
′
s for any s ∈ {1, ..., sˆ − 1}. In
what follows, we construct a sequence of players (i0, i1, i2, ...) and show by induction that the
underlying procedure which sequentially adds players to it can never break up so that we get
a contradiction to the finiteness of the player set N . For m ∈ N let Im := {i0, i1, ..., im} ⊆ N
denote the players of the sequence up to the mth one. We need to distinguish two cases.
Case 1: i ∈ L′sˆ
Set i0 = i. It then must be |Ni0(g
′
sˆ) ∩M
′
sˆ| ≥ 2 since otherwise one could reduce r
′
sˆ by not
including i0 and possibly her one contact belonging to M
′
sˆ. This guarantees that there exists
i1 ∈ Ni0(g
′
sˆ) ∩M
′
sˆ\{j}. So it is i0 ∈ M1 ∩ L
′
sˆ and i1 ∈ L1 ∩M
′
sˆ. Let I1 = {i0, i1}. Now
consider some odd number m ∈ N. Assume that L1 ∩ Im =M
′
sˆ ∩ Im, M1 ∩ Im = L
′
sˆ ∩ Im and
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that the cardinalities of these two sets are equal. We then have:
• It is 1 ≤ |M1 ∩ Im| = |L1 ∩ Im| and therefore by Lemma 3(i) there exists a player
im+1 ∈ L
g(L1 ∩ Im) ∩M1 ∩ I
∁
m. For this player it must hold that im+1 ∈ M1 ∩ L
′
sˆ\Im
since L1 ∩ Im ⊆M
′
sˆ and M1 ∩ L
′
s = ∅ for all s ∈ {1, ..., sˆ− 1}.
• It then is 1 ≤ |M ′sˆ ∩ Im+1| < |L
′
sˆ ∩ Im+1| and therefore by Lemma 3(ii) there exists
a player im+2 ∈ L
g′
sˆ(L′sˆ ∩ Im+1) ∩M
′
sˆ ∩ I
∁
m+1\{j}. For this player it must hold that
im+2 ∈ L1 ∩M
′
sˆ\Im+1 since L
′
sˆ ∩ Im+1 ⊆M1 and im+2 6= j.
Thus, it is L1∩ Im+2 =M
′
sˆ∩ Im+2, M1∩ Im+2 = L
′
sˆ∩ Im+2 and also the cardinalities of these
two sets are equal. Moreover, it is |Im+2| = |Im|+2. By induction it follows that the player
set N must be infinitely large. Thus, we arrive at a contradiction.
Case 2: i /∈ L′sˆ
In this case we must have j /∈M ′sˆ since by assumption M1 ∩ L
′
s = ∅ for all s ∈ {1, ..., sˆ− 1}.
For the same reason, i ∈M ′sˆ would imply j ∈ L
′
sˆ which is equivalent to Case 1. This is also
true for i /∈M ′sˆ and j ∈ L
′
sˆ. So it remains to consider the case that i, j /∈ (M
′
sˆ∪L
′
sˆ). However,
by assumption there must be a player i0 ∈ M1 ∩ L
′
sˆ. As in the previous case, existence of
another player i1 ∈ Ni0(g
′
sˆ)∩M
′
sˆ is then guaranteed and it must be i1 /∈ {i, j} since i, j /∈M
′
sˆ.
Therefore it is i1 ∈ L1∩M
′
sˆ. Let again I1 = {i0, i1} and assume for some odd number m ∈ N
that L1 ∩ Im =M
′
sˆ ∩ Im, M1 ∩ Im = L
′
sˆ ∩ Im and that the cardinalities of these two sets are
equal. Furthermore, assume that i, j /∈ Im. Similarly to the first case we have:
• There exists im+1 ∈M1 ∩ L
′
sˆ\Im for the stated reasons.
• By Lemma 3(ii) there then exists a player im+2 ∈ L
g′
sˆ(L′sˆ ∩ Im+1) ∩M
′
sˆ ∩ I
∁
m+1. For
this player it must hold that im+2 ∈ L1 ∩M
′
sˆ\Im+1 since L
′
sˆ ∩ Im+1 ⊆M1\{i, j}.
Thus, it is again L1 ∩ Im+2 =M
′
sˆ ∩ Im+2, M1 ∩ Im+2 = L
′
sˆ ∩ Im+2 and also the cardinalities
of these two sets are equal. Beyond that, we have i, j /∈ Im+2. By induction this leads again
to a contradiction to the finiteness of the player set N .
Summing up, we have that L1 ∩M
′
s = M1 ∩ L
′
s = ∅ for all s < s¯
′. Therefore, it must
be v∗i (g
′), v∗j (g
′) ≤ 12 . On the contrary, we know by Manea (2011a, Proposition 2) that
v∗i (g
′) + v∗j (g
′) ≥ 1. Taken together, this implies v∗i (g
′) = v∗j (g
′) = 12 .
With regard to the second part of the lemma consider the network g′ := g+ i(n+1) and
let (r′s, x
′
s,M
′
s, L
′
s, N
′
s, g
′
s)s=1,...,s¯′ be the outcome of A(g
′). It is clear that n+ 1 /∈ L′s for all
s < s¯′ since otherwise one could simply reduce r′s by deleting n+1 from L
′
s and possibly her
one neighbor i from M ′s. The possibility that i ∈ L
′
s for some s < s¯
′ can be ruled out by a
line of argumentation which is equivalent to the proof of the first part if one substitutes n+1
for j, M2 for M1 and L2 for L1 (while taking into account that A(g) provides M1 = {n+1}
and L1 = ∅ in this case).
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And finally we establish the second of the two lemmas.
Proof of Lemma 2. W.l.o.g. assume that g has only one component.28 Beside g consider the
network g′ := g−kl and let (r′s, x
′
s,M
′
s, L
′
s, N
′
s, g
′
s)s′=1,...,s¯′ be the outcome of A(g
′). Similarly
to the proof of Lemma 1 assume for contradiction that there exists a step sˆ ∈ {1, ..., s¯′ − 1}
such that L1 ∩ M
′
s = M1 ∩ L
′
s = ∅ for all s ∈ {1, ..., sˆ − 1} but L1 ∩ M
′
sˆ 6= ∅. Observe
that M1 ∩ L
′
sˆ 6= ∅ would also entail L1 ∩ M
′
sˆ 6= ∅ since due to the minimality of r
′
sˆ any
player in M1 ∩ L
′
sˆ needs to have a g
′-neighbor in M ′ˆˆs who then must have been a neighbor
in g as well. We again construct a sequence of players (i0, i1, i2, ...) and show by induction
that the underlying procedure which sequentially adds players to it can never break up,
meaning that we get a contradiction to the finiteness of the player set N . For m ∈ N let
Im := {i0, i1, ..., im} ⊆ N denote the players of the sequence up to the mth one.
Initially, select some player i0 ∈ L1 ∩M
′
sˆ. i0 cannot be isolated or a loose-end player, i.e.
she must have more than one link in g, since otherwise one could reduce r1 by not including
i0 in L1 and possibly her one contact in M1. This guarantees that there exists i1 ∈ Ni0(g
′).
It must be i1 ∈ M1 ∩ L
′
sˆ since by assumption M1 ∩ L
′
s = ∅ for all s ∈ {1, ..., sˆ − 1}. Let
I1 = {i0, i1}. Now consider some odd number m ∈ N. Assume that L1 ∩ Im = M
′
sˆ ∩ Im,
M1 ∩ Im = L
′
sˆ ∩ Im and that the cardinalities of these two sets are equal. We then have:
• It is 1 ≤ |M ′sˆ ∩ Im| = |L
′
sˆ ∩ Im| and therefore by Lemma 3(i) there exists a player
im+1 ∈ L
g′
sˆ(L′sˆ ∩ Im) ∩M
′
sˆ ∩ I
∁
m. For this player it must hold that im+1 ∈ L1 ∩M
′
sˆ\Im
since it is L′sˆ ∩ Im ⊆M1.
• Then it is 1 ≤ |M1 ∩ Im+1| < |L1 ∩ Im+1| and therefore by Lemma 3(ii) there exists
a player im+2 ∈ L
g(L1 ∩ Im+1) ∩M1 ∩ I
∁
m+1 ∩ L
g′
sˆ(L1 ∩ Im+1) since g
′ arose from g
by a single link deletion and, additionally, M1 ∩ L
′
s = ∅ for all s ∈ {1, ..., sˆ − 1} and
L1 ∩ Im+1 ⊆M
′
sˆ. This reasoning then also implies that im+2 ∈M1 ∩ L
′
sˆ\Im+1.
Thus it is L1 ∩ Im+2 = M
′
sˆ ∩ Im+2, M1 ∩ Im+2 = L
′
sˆ ∩ Im+2 and also the cardinalities
of these two sets are equal. Moreover, it is |Im+2| = |Im| + 2. Again, by induction this
leads to a contradiction to the finiteness of the player set N . Consequently, it must be
L1 ∩M
′
s = M1 ∩ L
′
s = ∅ for all s < s¯
′. Since L1 and Ms do not intersect for any s ∈ N, we
get v∗j (g − kl) ≥
1
2 for all j ∈ L1.
A.5. Proof of Proposition 2
First note that by Theorems 1–3 any nongenerically pairwise stable gˆ contains at least
one nonequitable component C of at least three players for c < 12 . In what follows the
Proposition’s four parts are shown separately. By component decomposability, we restrict
28Again, this is w.l.o.g. as the profile of payoffs respectively profits is component-decomposable.
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w.l.o.g. to nongenercially pairwise stable networks that consist only of one such nonequitable
component C, i.e. where g := gˆ|C .
Proof of Proposition 2(i). Let g be a tree with n > 3 players and assume that g is pairwise
stable. By Theorem 2 it cannot be the case that all players receive a payoff of 12 in g.
According to Proposition 1 and Corollary 2, the algorithm A(g) therefore has to stop after
the first step providing an outcome (r1, x1,M1, L1, N1, g1) with M1 ∪˙ L1 = N , |M1| > |L1|
and g|M1 = g|L1 = ∅. So we have r1 ∈ (0, 1) and v
∗
i (g) = 1 − v
∗
j (g) = x1 ∈ (0,
1
2) for all
i ∈M1, j ∈ L1. Theorem 3 then implies that
x1 + c =
1
2
. (A.1)
The class of tree networks we consider here can be divided into the following subclasses:
(a) No player has more than two links in g, meaning that g is a line network.
(b) There is a player who has more than two links in g such that at least two of her
neighbors are loose-end players.29
(c) There is a player who has more than two links in g but no player has more than one
loose-end contact.
In the following, we distinguish between these three subclasses and show separately that
there arises a contradiction to pairwise stability.
Subclass (a):
W.l.o.g. let g := {12, 23, ..., (n−1)n}. Here n must be odd since otherwise it would obviously
be |L
g(M)|
|M | ≥ 1 for all g-independent sets M ⊆ N inducing a payoff of
1
2 for every player. So
by assumption it must be n ≥ 5. Considering the algorithm A(g), we find that the shortage
ratio is minimized by the g-independent set which contains the players 1, 3, ..., n − 2, n.
Therefore, it is r1 =
n−1
n+1 and x =
n−1
2n . Hence, by (A.1),
c =
1
2n
. (A.2)
Now, if player 3 deletes her link to player 2, then she becomes a loose-end player. Moreover,
in the network g− 23 she is contained in a component with an odd number of players which
induces a line of length n−2. Hence, it is v∗3(g−23) =
n−3
2(n−2) . Taking into account equation
(A.2), the corresponding stability condition yields
u∗3(g)− u
∗
3(g − 23) ≥ 0 ⇔ v
∗
3(g)− v
∗
3(g − 23)− c ≥ 0
⇔
n− 1
2n
−
n− 3
2(n− 2)
−
1
2n
≥ 0
29Recall that some i ∈ N is said to be a loose-end player if it is ηi(g) = 1, that is if she has exactly one
link in g.
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⇔
4− n
2n(n− 2)
≥ 0.
Obviously, this is never fulfilled for n ≥ 5, meaning that a line network cannot be pairwise
stable.
Subclass (b):
Let k ∈ N be a player with at least three neighbors including two or more loose-end players.
Then Manea (2011a, Theorem 3) implies that it is v∗k(g) ≥
2
3 . So it must be k ∈ L1. Select a
player i ∈ Nk(g) such that ηi(g) ≥ ηi′(g) for all i
′ ∈ Nk(g). Note that in the network g − ki,
player k still has at least two loose-end contacts such that again according to Manea (2011a,
Theorem 3) we have v∗k(g − ki) ≥
2
3 . The corresponding stability condition then gives
u∗k(g) ≥ u
∗
k(g − ki) ⇔ v
∗
k(g)− c ≥ v
∗
k(g − ki) ⇒ 1− x1 − c ≥
2
3
⇔ x1 + c ≤
1
3
.
This obviously contradicts equation (A.1). Thus, a network g belonging to Subclass (b)
cannot be pairwise stable.
Subclass (c):
First deliberate the following: For any tree network g˜ and any player k ∈ N there exists a
unique partition
(
Brkν
)
ν∈Nk(g˜)
of N\{k} such that for all ν ∈ Nk(g˜) it is ν ∈ Br
k
ν and g˜|Brkν is
connected, i.e. g˜|Brkν has only one component (if one restricts the player set to Br
k
ν). Based
on this observation, we define the subnetworks
(
g˜|Brkν
)
ν∈Nk(g)
to be the branches of player k
in g˜ and ν ∈ Nk(g˜) is said to be the fork player of g˜|Brkν .
Note that if g belongs to Subclass (c), then there exists a player k ∈ N who has more
than two links such that for at least all but one of her branches, all players contained in these
have at most two links in g. If this would not be the case, the following procedure would
never stop, meaning that there would have to be infinitely many players in N : Initially, select
a player k0 having more than two links and one of her branches containing another player
k1 with more than two links. Then by assumption player k1 must have a branch in g which
does not contain player k0 but a player k2 who also has more than two links. For this player
k2 there must again be a branch in g not containing k0 and k1 but a player k3 having more
than two links. Continuing this way, for any m ∈ N there is a player km+1 ∈ N\{k0, ..., km},
which then gives a contradiction by induction. Thus, a player k as mentioned above must
indeed exist.
In the following we distinguish two cases.
Case (c).1: k ∈ L1
If there are other players having more than two links, then let i ∈ N be the fork player of
player k’s branch which contains all of them. Otherwise, arbitrarily pick some i ∈ Nk(g).
In both cases consider the network g − ki and the component C ⊂ N which player k is
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contained in. In the network g|C , there is only player k who might have more than two links.
Furthermore, every branch of player k in g|C must be a line of odd length as Manea (2011a,
Theorem 3) implies that any loose-end player in g is contained in M1. In turn, this implies
that for any g|C-independent set M with
|Lg|C (M)|
|M | < 1 it is k ∈ L
g|C (M). One example
for such a set is M1 ∩ C with partner set L1 ∩ C. Hence, it must be v
∗
k(g − ki) >
1
2 . The
corresponding stability condition then gives
u∗k(g) ≥ u
∗
k(g − ki) ⇔ v
∗
k(g)− c ≥ v
∗
k(g − ki) ⇒ 1− x1 − c >
1
2
⇔ x1 + c <
1
2
.
This obviously again contradicts equation (A.1). Consequently, a network g belonging to
Subclass (c) with k ∈ L1 cannot be pairwise stable.
Case (c).2:
We need to introduce some additional notation here. Identify a branch of player k which is
a line network with minimal length among all of these line branches. We denote the set of
players in this branch by B1 ⊂ N . Note that any branch of player k which is a line must be
of even length. Let Mˆ1 :=M1 ∩B
1 and Lˆ1 := L1 ∩B
1. Then it is |Mˆ1| = |Lˆ1|. Let j denote
the fork player of this branch. In addition, let B2 ⊂ N denote the set of all players contained
in the other line branch(es) of player k. Let similarly Mˆ2 := M1 ∩ B
2 and Lˆ2 := L1 ∩ B
2.
Then we have |Mˆ2| = |Lˆ2| ≥ |Mˆ1|. Finally, let B3 := N\(B1 ∪˙B2 ∪˙{k}) and Mˆ3 :=M1∩B
3,
Lˆ3 := L1 ∩B
3. Then it must be |Mˆ3| ≥ |Lˆ3| as we have |M1| > |L1|.
Note that we must have r1 =
|L1|
|M1|
≤ |Lˆ
3|
|Mˆ3|
since r1 is the minimal shortage ratio for g and
obviously Lg(Mˆ3) = Lˆ3. Thus, applying the above notation gives
x1 =
|L1|
|M1|+ |L1|
=
|Mˆ1|+ |Mˆ2|+ |Lˆ3|
2|Mˆ1|+ 2|Mˆ2|+ |Mˆ3|+ |Lˆ3|+ 1
. (A.3)
Now consider the network g′ := g − kj and let (r′s, x
′
s,M
′
s, L
′
s, N
′
s, g
′
s)s=1,...,s¯′ be the out-
come of the algorithm A(g′). Notice first that the set Mˆ2 ∪˙Mˆ3 ∪˙{k} ⊂M1 is g
′-independent
and Lˆ2 ∪˙ Lˆ3 is the corresponding partner set in g′. Furthermore, we have
|Lˆ2|+ |Lˆ3|
|Mˆ2|+ |Mˆ3|+ 1
=
|Mˆ2|+ |Lˆ3|
|Mˆ2|+ |Mˆ3|+ 1
< 1.
Assume for contradiction that there is another g′-independent set M ′ ⊆ N with partner
set L′ = Lg
′
(M ′) ⊆ N which is shortage ratio minimizing in step s = 1 of A(g′). Since the
set B1 is a component of g′ and it induces a line network of even length where every player
receives a payoff of 12 , we must have (M
′ ∪ L′) ∩ B1 = ∅ and s¯′ ≥ 2. Moreover, Lemma 2
yields that M1 ∩L
′
s = L1 ∩M
′
s = ∅ for all s < s¯
′. Hence, we must have M ′ ⊂ Mˆ2 ∪˙ Mˆ3 ∪˙ {k}
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and L′ ⊂ Lˆ2 ∪˙ Lˆ3 such that
|L′|
|M ′|
<
|Mˆ2|+ |Lˆ3|
|Mˆ2|+ |Mˆ3|+ 1
< 1.
On the contrary, M ′ ∪˙ Mˆ1 ⊂M1 is g-independent and we have L
g(M ′ ∪˙ Mˆ1) = L′ ∪˙ Lˆ1. The
minimality of r1 =
|L1|
|M1|
in A(g) then implies
r1 =
|Mˆ2|+ |Lˆ3|+ |Mˆ1|
|Mˆ2|+ |Mˆ3|+ 1 + |Mˆ1|
≤
|L′|+ |Mˆ1|
|M ′|+ |Mˆ1|
< 1 ⇒
|Mˆ2|+ |Lˆ3|
|Mˆ2|+ |Mˆ3|+ 1
≤
|L′|
|M ′|
.
Thus, arriving at a contradiction, this implies that
v∗k(g
′) =
|Mˆ2|+ |Lˆ3|
2|Mˆ2|+ |Mˆ3|+ |Lˆ3|+ 1
. (A.4)
Taking into account equation (A.2), the corresponding stability condition demands
u∗k(g) ≥ u
∗
k(g − kj) ⇔ v
∗
k(g)− ηk(g)c ≥ v
∗
k(g
′)− ηk(g
′)c
⇔ x1 ≥ v
∗
k(g
′) +
1
2
− x1
⇔ 2x1 − v
∗
k(g
′) ≥
1
2
(A.5)
However, we now establish that it must be 2x1 − v
∗
k(g
′) < 12 . Recalling equations (A.3) and
(A.4), some calculation yields
2x1 − v
∗
k(g
′) =
2|Mˆ1|+ 2(|Mˆ2|+ |Lˆ3|)
2|Mˆ1|+ (2|Mˆ2|+ |Mˆ3|+ |Lˆ3|+ 1)
−
(|Mˆ2|+ |Lˆ3|)
(2|Mˆ2|+ |Mˆ3|+ |Lˆ3|+ 1)
=
2|Mˆ1|(|Mˆ2|+ |Mˆ3|+ 1) + (|Mˆ2|+ |Lˆ3|)(2|Mˆ2|+ |Mˆ3|+ |Lˆ3|+ 1)
2|Mˆ1|(2|Mˆ2|+ |Mˆ3|+ |Lˆ3|+ 1) + (2|Mˆ2|+ |Mˆ3|+ |Lˆ3|+ 1)2
=
D −R
2D
,
where
D = 2|Mˆ1|(2|Mˆ2|+ |Mˆ3|+ |Lˆ3|+ 1) + (2|Mˆ2|+ |Mˆ3|+ |Lˆ3|+ 1)2 > 0
and
R =− 2|Mˆ1||Mˆ3|+ 2|Mˆ1||Lˆ3| − 2|Mˆ1|+ 2|Mˆ2||Mˆ3| − 2|Mˆ2||Lˆ3|+ 2|Mˆ2|+ |Mˆ3|2
+ 2|Mˆ3| − |Lˆ3|2 + 1
= 2(|Mˆ2| − |Mˆ1|︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
) + 2(|Mˆ3| − |Lˆ3|︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
)(|Mˆ2| − |Mˆ1|︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
) + (|Mˆ3|2 − |Lˆ3|2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
) + 2|Mˆ3|+ 1
≥ 2|Mˆ3|+ 1
34
> 0.
Hence, we indeed have
2x1 − v
∗
k(g − kj) =
D −R
2D
<
1
2
.
This concludes the proof for Subclass (c) and of the whole proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2(ii). Consider a pairwise stable network g and assume that there is
a cut-player k ∈ N who is part of a cycle and receives a payoff v∗k(g) >
1
2 . According to
Proposition 1 and Corollary 2, the algorithm A(g) must stop after the first step providing an
outcome (r1, x1,M1, L1, N1, g1) with M1 ∪˙ L1 = N , |M1| > |L1| and g|M1 = g|L1 = ∅. So we
have r1 =
|L1|
|M1|
∈ (0, 1), k ∈ L1 and v
∗
k(g) = 1− x1. Further, by Theorem 3 it is x1 + c =
1
2 .
In what follows, we prove that player k can delete a certain link such that in the resulting
network she still receives a payoff greater than 12 . To start with, note that by assumption
there must be a set K ⊂ N with k ∈ K such that
• Lg(K\{k}) ⊆ K,
• k is contained in a cycle in g|K∁∪{k} and
• g|K∁ has only one component (as usual, considering K
∁ as player set).
As g has only one component, it must be k ∈ Lg(K\{k}), meaning that Nk(g) ∩ K 6= ∅.
Moreover, there exists i′ ∈ Nk(g)\K such that k and i
′ belong to the same cycle in g. Now
consider the network g′ := g − ki′ and let (r′s, x
′
s,M
′
s, L
′
s, N
′
s, g
′
s)s=1,...,s¯′ be the outcome of
A(g′). Lemma 2 yields that v∗k(g
′) ≥ 12 . Assume for contradiction that we have v
∗
k(g
′) = 12 ,
meaning that k ∈ N ′s¯′ .
Consider the set C ′k := Ck(g
′
s¯′ |K) = Ck(g|N ′
s¯′
∩K), that is the component of player k in
the network g restricted to the set N ′s¯′ ∩K. As a first step, we establish that it is
|L1 ∩ C
′
k|
|M1 ∩ C ′k|
= 1. (A.6)
Note first that we have Nk(g
′|K) 6= ∅. Furthermore, it must be Nk(g
′) ⊆M1∩N
′
s¯′ as Lemma
2 yields M1 ∩ L
′
s = ∅ for all s < s¯
′. This guarantees that M1 ∩ C
′
k 6= ∅. Based on this, we
can immediately rule out the possibility that the left-hand side of (A.6) is strictly smaller
than one since M1 ∩ C
′
k is g
′-independent and clearly Lg
′
s¯′ (M1 ∩ C
′
k) ⊆ L1 ∩ C
′
k. So assume
that the left-hand side of (A.6) is strictly greater than one. We make use of the following
implication which we verify at the end of the proof:
|Lˆ| = |Mˆ | ≥ 1 for Lˆ ⊆ L1 ∩ C
′
k\{k}, Nk(g) ∩K ⊆ Mˆ ⊆ M1 ∩ C
′
k
⇒ Lg
′
s¯′ (Lˆ)\Mˆ 6= ∅ (A.7)
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We know that it is ∅ 6= Nk(g) ∩ K ⊆ Nk(g
′) ⊆ N ′s¯′ . Let Mˆ
0 := Nk(g) ∩ K such that
Mˆ0 ⊆M1 ∩ C
′
k. Hence, it must be |L1 ∩ C
′
k\{k}| ≥ |Mˆ
0| since otherwise we would get
|L1 ∩ C
′
k|
|M1 ∩ C ′k|
≤
|L1 ∩ C
′
k|
|Mˆ0|
≤ 1,
that is a contradiction to our assumption. So select a set of players Lˆ0 ⊆ L1 ∩ C
′
k\{k} with
|Lˆ0| = |Mˆ0|. Note that Mˆ0 and Lˆ0 satisfy the conditions of implication (A.7).
Based on this, we can construct a sequence of players (j1, j2, j3, ...) in a certain way such
that according to the previous considerations, the underlying procedure which sequentially
adds players to the sequence can never break up. As in the proofs of Lemma 1 and 2,
this leads to a contradiction to the finiteness of the player set N . Given such a sequence,
let Mˆm := {jl | 1 ≤ l ≤ m, l odd} ∪ Mˆ
0 and Lˆm := {jl | 1 ≤ l ≤ m, l even} ∪ Lˆ
0 for
m ∈ N. Now consider some even number m ∈ N ∪ {0}. Assume that Lˆm ⊆ L1 ∩ C
′
k\{k},
Nk(g) ∩K ⊆ Mˆ
m ⊆M1 ∩ C
′
k and |Lˆ
m| = |Mˆm| ≥ 1. We then have:
• By implication (A.7) there exists jm+1 ∈ L
g′
s¯′ (Lˆm)\Mˆm. For this player it must hold
that jm+1 ∈M1 ∩ C
′
k\Mˆ
m since Lˆm ⊆ L1 ∩ C
′
k\{k}.
• Then there must exist jm+2 ∈ L1 ∩ C
′
k\(Lˆ
m+1 ∪˙ {k}) since otherwise we would have
1 <
|L1 ∩ C
′
k|
|M1 ∩ C ′k|
≤
|Lˆm+1 ∪˙ {k}|
|Mˆm+1|
= 1.
Thus it is Lˆm+2 ⊆ L1 ∩ C
′
k\{k}, Nk(g) ∩K ⊆ Mˆ
m+2 ⊆ M1 ∩ C
′
k and |Lˆ
m+2| = |Mˆm+2| =
|Lˆm| + 1 ≥ 1. By induction this leads to a contradiction to the finiteness of the player set
N . This establishes equation (A.6), however, under the assumption of having v∗k(g
′) = 12 .
During the second step we now use this to construct a concluding contradiction of similar
kind arising from the assumption that v∗k(g
′) = 12 . Here, we make use of the following
implication:
|L˜| = |M˜ | ≥ 1 for L˜ ⊆ L1 ∩N
′
s¯′\K, M˜ ⊆M1 ∩N
′
s¯′\K ⇒ L
g′
s¯′ (L˜)\(M˜ ∪˙K) 6= ∅ (A.8)
Its verification is postponed to the end of this proof as well. Note that by definition it is
|Lgs¯′ (M¯)|
|M¯ |
≥ 1 for all g′-independent sets M¯ ⊆ N ′s¯′ . Based on this, we can again construct
a sequence of players (i1, i2, i3, ...) such that, according to the previous considerations, the
sequential adding of new players can never break up. Thus, we again get a contradiction to
the finiteness of the player set N . For this purpose, we define the sets M˜m := {il | 1 ≤ l ≤
m, l odd} and L˜m := {il | 1 ≤ l ≤ m, l even} for m ∈ N.
Initially, select a player i1 ∈ M1 ∩ N
′
s¯′\K. Such a player must exist as k ∈ L1 ∩ N
′
s¯′ is
part of a cycle in g|N\K∪{k} and, according to Lemma 2, we have M1 ∩L
′
s = ∅ for all s < s¯
′.
Now consider some odd number m ∈ N. Assume that M˜m ⊆M1∩N
′
s¯′\K, L˜
m ⊆ L1∩N
′
s¯′\K
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and that |M˜m| = m+12 >
m−1
2 = |L˜
m|. We then have:
• M˜m ∪˙ (M1 ∩ C
′
k) ⊆ N
′
s¯′ is g
′-independent and
|L˜m ∪˙ (L1 ∩ C
′
k)|
|M˜m ∪˙ (M1 ∩ C ′k)|
< 1
since it is |L1 ∩ C
′
k| = |M1 ∩ C
′
k| as we know from equation (A.6). As we have
k ∈ Lg
′
s¯′ (M1 ∩ C
′
k) ⊆ L1 ∩ C
′
k, this implies that there must exist a player im+1 ∈
Lg
′
s¯′ (M˜m)\(L˜m ∪˙K). It is im+1 ∈ L1 ∩N
′
s¯′\(L˜
m ∪˙K) since M˜m ⊆M1.
• We then have |L˜m+1| = |M˜m+1| = m+12 ≥ 1 and L˜
m+1 ⊆ L1 ∩ N
′
s¯′\K, M˜
m+1 ⊆
M1∩N
′
s¯′\K. Hence, by implication (A.8) there exists im+2 ∈ L
g′
s¯′ (L˜m+1)\(M˜m+1 ∪˙K).
It is im+2 ∈M1 ∩N
′
s¯′\(M˜
m+1 ∪˙K) since L˜m+1 ⊆ L1.
Thus, we have M˜m+2 ⊆ M1 ∩ N
′
s¯′\K, L˜
m+2 ⊆ L1 ∩ N
′
s¯′\K and |M˜
m+2| = (m+2)+12 >
(m+2)−1
2 = |L˜
m+2|. Again, by induction this leads to a contradiction to the finiteness of the
player set N . This proves that player k’s payoff must indeed be strictly greater than 12 . The
corresponding stability condition then yields
u∗k(g) ≥ u
∗
k(g − ki
′) ⇔ v∗k(g)− c ≥ v
∗
k(g
′) ⇒ 1− x1 − c >
1
2
⇔ x1 + c <
1
2
,
which is a contradiction to Theorem 3. Hence, such a network g cannot be pairwise stable.
It remains to prove implications (A.7) and (A.8). We start with the first one. Given the
two sets Lˆ ⊆ L1∩C
′
k\{k} and Mˆ ⊆M1∩C
′
k with Nk(g)∩K ⊆ Mˆ and |Lˆ| = |Mˆ | ≥ 1 assume
for contradiction that Lg
′
s¯′ (Lˆ) ⊆ Mˆ . Note that we have Nj(g
′
s¯′) = Nj(g) for all j ∈ Lˆ since it
is Lˆ ⊆ L1∩N
′
s¯′\{k} and, according to Lemma 2,M1∩L
′
s = ∅ for all s < s¯
′. Together with the
assumption this implies that Lg(M1 ∩K\Mˆ) ⊆ L1 ∩K\Lˆ. Moreover, since Nk(g)∩K ⊆ Mˆ ,
it even is Lg(M1 ∩K\Mˆ) ⊆ L1 ∩K\(Lˆ ∪˙ {k}).
Additionally, we need the following inequalities:
|L1 ∩K| − 1
|M1 ∩K|
≤ r1 ≤
|L1 ∩K|
|M1 ∩K|
≤ 1 (A.9)
To see that these are correct, note first that it is Lg(M1 ∩ K) ⊆ L1 ∩ K and similarly
Lg(M1\K) ⊆ L1\K ∪˙ {k}. So we must have r1 ≤
|L1∩K|
|M1∩K|
and r1 ≤
|L1\K|+1
|M1\K|
as r1 is the
minimal shortage ratio. Moreover, it is r1 =
|L1|
|M1|
< 1, M1 = (M1 ∩ K) ∪˙ (M1\K) and
L1 = (L1 ∩ K) ∪˙ (L1\K). Together this implies that
|L1∩K|−1
|M1∩K|
= |L1|−(|L1\K|+1)|M1|−|M1\K| ≤ r1. In
particular, this means that |L1 ∩K| − 1 < |M1 ∩K| which in turn implies
|L1∩K|
|M1∩K|
≤ 1.
According to the third inequality in (A.9) we must have M1 ∩K\Mˆ 6= ∅ since otherwise
it would be |L1 ∩K| ≤ |M1 ∩K| = |Mˆ | = |Lˆ| < |Lˆ ∪˙ {k}| ≤ |L1 ∩K|. Taken together, this
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leads to the following contradiction:
r1 ≤
|Lg(M1 ∩K\Mˆ)|
|M1 ∩K\Mˆ |
≤
|L1 ∩K\(Lˆ ∪˙ {k})|
|M1 ∩K\Mˆ |
=
|L1 ∩K| − |Lˆ| − 1
|M1 ∩K| − |Mˆ |
=
|L1 ∩K| − 1− |Lˆ|
|M1 ∩K| − |Lˆ|
<
|L1 ∩K| − 1
|M1 ∩K|
≤ r1,
where the last two inequalities are due to (A.9) and the fact that r1 < 1.
Similarly, to prove implication (A.8), we consider the two sets L˜ ⊆ L1 ∩N
′
s¯′\K and M˜ ⊆
M1 ∩ N
′
s¯′\K with |L˜| = |M˜ | ≥ 1 and assume for contradiction that we have L
g′
s¯′ (L˜) ⊆ M˜ .
Again according to Lemma 2, it must be Nj(g
′
s¯′) = Nj(g) for all j ∈ L˜. Hence, we have
that Lg(M1\M˜) ⊆ L1\L˜. Also, it is clear that M1\M˜ 6= ∅ since otherwise we would have
|L1| < |M1| = |M˜ | = |L˜| ≤ |L1|. Summing up, this implies
r1 ≤
|Lg(M1\M˜)|
|M1\M˜ |
≤
|L1\L˜|
|M1\M˜ |
=
|L1| − |L˜|
|M1| − |M˜ |
=
|L1| − |L˜|
|M1| − |L˜|
<
|L1|
|M1|
= r1,
which is obviously again a contradiction. So we have that Lg
′
s¯′ (L˜)\(M˜ ∪˙K) 6= ∅ since it is
Lg
′
s¯′ (L˜) ⊆ K∁. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2(iii). Note first that, according to our characterization result, a com-
ponent-induced subnetwork g′ as mentioned in part (iii) could only be contained in a pairwise
stable network if the algorithm A(g′) stops after the first step. Let (r1, x,M1, L1, N1, g1)
denote its outcome. By assumption, we obviously have |M1| = m and |L1| <
m
3 . On the
contrary, recalling stability condition (A.1), we get
1
4
≥ c =
1
2
− x =
1
2
−
|L1|
|M1|+ |L1|
=
1
2
|M1| − |L1|
|M1|+ |L1|
⇔ 3|L1| ≥ |M1|.
Arriving at a contradiction, this proves the proposition’s part (iii).
Proof of Proposition 2(iv). By Theorem 3, g is connected and bipartite such that we have
vi(g) =
1
2 − c for all i ∈ M and vj(g) =
1
2 + c for all j ∈ L, implying that A(g) terminates
after the first step. For some i ∈M and j ∈ L consider now the network g′ := g− ij and let
(r′s, x
′
s,M
′
s, L
′
s, N
′
s, g
′
s)s′=1,...,s¯′ be the outcome of A(g
′). Note that v∗i (g
′) must be such that
0 < c ≤ v∗i (g)−v
∗
i (g
′), otherwise i has an incentive to delete the link ij contradicting pairwise
stability of g. Furthermore, there exists an sˆ′ < s¯′ such that i ∈M ′sˆ′ since vi(g
′) < vi(g) <
1
2 .
Suppose sˆ′ 6= 1. For all k ∈ M ′1 we then get v
∗
k(g
′) =
|L′1|
|M ′
1
|+|L′
1
| <
|L′
sˆ
|
|M ′
sˆ′
|+|L′
sˆ′
| = v
∗
i (g
′) <
v∗i (g) = v
∗
k(g) (where the last equality holds because by Lemma 2 we have k ∈ M). The
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partner set of M ′1 is the same in both networks g and g
′ since i /∈ M ′1 and M
′
1 ⊂ M by
Lemma 2. This is a contradiction to the minimality of the shortage ratio in the first step
of the algorithm A(g) implying i ∈ M ′1. Similarly, we have j /∈ L
′
1 since otherwise by
v∗i (g) < v
∗
i (g
′) we get a contradiction to the minimality of the shortage ratio in the first step
of A(g). Since j /∈ L′1, we have Nj(g) ∩M
′
1 \ {i} = ∅. The cardinalities m
′ := |M ′1| and
l′ := |L′1| then determine the payoff of player i in network g
′ such that v∗i (g
′) = l
′
l′+m′ . From
c ≤ v∗i (g)− v
∗
i (g
′) and v∗i (g) =
1
2 − c we get c ≤
1
2
(
1
2 −
l′
l′+m′
)
showing the first part.
For the second part, note that in network g = g′ + ij we have that M ′1 implies the
partner set L′1 ∪ {j}. However, since the algorithm delivers v
∗
i (g) =
|L|
|M |+|L| we must have
v∗i (g) ≤
|L′1∪{j}|
|M ′
1
|+|L′
1
∪{j}| =
l′+1
m′+l′+1 . In particular, we then have
l′+1
m′+l′+1 −
l′
l′+m′ ≥ v
∗
i (g)− v
∗
i (g
′) ≥ c ⇔ m
′
(m′+l′)2+(m′+l′)
≥ c
implying the second part.
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